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INVESTIGATING BRAIN NETWORKS ASSOCIATED WITH INSIGHT IN
ADOLESCENTS AT ULTRA HIGH-RISK FOR SCHIZOPHRENIA

By

SARAH V. CLARK

Under the Direction of Jessica Turner, PhD

ABSTRACT
Background. Impaired insight, or unawareness of illness, is a common symptom of
schizophrenia. Clinical insight is awareness of having a mental disorder; cognitive insight is
ability to self-reflect (self-reflectiveness) and certainty in cognitions (self-certainty). In
schizophrenia insight is associated with brain function and improving insight is a potential early
intervention point. This study investigated whether insight is impaired in youth at ultra high-risk
(UHR) for psychosis, and if it is related to major brain networks. Methods. Data from a larger
UHR study was used, including 55 UHR adolescents and 55 controls assessed with the
Structured Interview of Prodromal Symptoms, MATRICS Consensus Cognitive Battery, Scale to
Assess Unawareness of Mental Disorder, and Beck Cognitive Insight Scale, as well as resting
state functional MRI scans. UHR and control groups were tested for differences in selfreflectiveness and self-certainty, and correlations between insight dimensions and clinical and
cognitive measures. Functional connectivity was calculated for the default mode, the cinguloopercular, and central executive networks and regressed on participants’ reported clinical and

cognitive insight, while covarying for head motion. Results. Self-reflectiveness was higher in the
UHR group (d = 1.28), but the groups did not differ in self-certainty (d = 0.28). Among UHR,
poorer clinical insight was related to greater symptom severity. Default mode connectivity was
negatively correlated with self-reflectiveness (R2 = .091) and clinical insight (R2 = .399) in UHR,
but no such correlations were found in controls. Cerebello-prefrontal cortex connectivity was
negatively associated with self-certainty in the UHR group (R2 = .089 - .138). Conclusions.
Default mode connectivity appears to be associated with the facets of insight concerning selfawareness, whereas cerebello-prefrontal connectivity appears to be associated specifically with
self-certainty. This is the first study to relate major brain networks to insight before the onset of
psychosis, and is consistent with models proposing that different facets of insight are related to
self-awareness and executive functioning through networks associated with these processes.
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1
1.1

INTRODUCTION

Ultra High-Risk
Schizophrenia is a devastating mental illness which incurs large costs to society

(Mcevoy, 2007). It is characterized by psychotic symptoms, including positive symptoms (e.g.,
hallucinations, delusions), negative symptoms (e.g., anhedonia, flattened affect), disorganized
symptoms (e.g., disorganized thought processes), and cognitive deficits (e.g., processing speed,
working memory) (Kay, Fiszbein, & Opler, 1987). The process of developing schizophrenia
likely begins well before the first psychotic episode; the diathesis-stress model of schizophrenia
posits that people are born with vulnerability to psychosis and that biological, social,
environmental, and cognitive factors work together throughout development to eventually cause
psychotic symptoms (Howes & Murray, 2014). Symptoms typically begin to manifest during
adolescence, while the brain is going through many changes (Menon, 2013; Yung & McGorry,
1996).
Because schizophrenia has a neurodevelopmental component, many studies now focus on
a population of individuals at ultra high-risk (UHR) for psychosis, the putative prodromal phase
of schizophrenia (Nelson, Thompson, & Yung, 2012). This stage of psychosis is characterized by
cognitive deficits accompanied by either presence of attenuated psychotic symptoms or genetic
risk/schizotypy and a decline in functioning (McGlashan et al., 2001). See Figure 1 for a
description of how adolescents are classified as UHR. The UHR criteria help to identify people
at high risk for developing psychosis, but since only approximately 35% go on to transition to a
psychotic disorder (Cannon et al., 2008), there is still low positive predictive value (Fusar-Poli et
al., 2013). Therefore, it is beneficial to investigate clinical and neurobiological factors that can
identify who is most at risk and most likely to benefit from treatment. Insight into illness may be
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one such factor, as there is evidence insight is related to treatment adherence and outcome in
schizophrenia (Lincoln, Lüllmann, & Rief, 2007). Further, adolescence may be an optimal time
to provide primary interventions, with aims of reducing duration of untreated psychosis or
preventing psychosis onset.

1
• Attenuated
positive
symptoms [score
of 3 - 5 on SIPS
positive scale]

2
• Decline in global
functioning
• Schizotypal
personality
disorder
• Age < 19

3
• Decline in global
functioning
• Genetic risk [firstdegree relative
with psychotic
disorder]

Figure 1 Three (not mutually exclusive) ways of categorizing individuals as ultra high-risk
(UHR).
Positive symptoms refer to unusual thought content (delusions), suspiciousness, grandiosity,
perceptual abnormalities (hallucinations), and disorganized behavior. A decline in global
functioning refers to a 30% decline on the Global Assessment of Functioning compared to
baseline. SIPS, Structured Interview of Prodromal Syndromes.

1.2

Insight
Insight broadly refers to a person’s awareness of having an illness or disorder (Amador &

Kronengold, 2004). It is estimated that approximately 50% of those diagnosed with
schizophrenia are unaware of their illness, and that this is relatively stable (Arango & Amador,
2011), but may fluctuate with symptom severity along the course of the illness (Parellada et al.,
2011; Quee et al., 2011). Impaired insight can impact prognosis and treatment adherence in
schizophrenia, and may predict functioning (Lincoln et al., 2007). However, Lincoln et al. (2007)
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noted that there is a complex relationship between insight and symptoms. People with lower
insight tend to have greater symptom severity (Mintz, Dobson, & Romney, 2003), but symptoms
only account for a small amount of variance and do not always predict insight, indicating other
factors are involved (van der Meer et al., 2013). In addition, different dimensions of insight may
be associated with different symptom profiles or other factors (Mintz et al., 2003).
Insight is considered to be on a continuum and to consist of multiple dimensions on
which a person with schizophrenia may be impaired. Dimensions proposed to comprise insight
include clinical insight: awareness of illness, awareness of need for treatment, awareness of
social consequences, awareness and attribution of symptoms; and cognitive insight: selfreflectiveness and self-certainty (Amador et al., 1993; Beck, Baruch, Balter, Steer, & Warman,
2004; Birchwood et al., 1994; David, 1990; Gerretsen, Remington, et al., 2014; Marková et al.,
2003; McEvoy, Aland, Wilson, Guy, & Hawkins, 1981). A number of measures have been
developed to investigate clinical insight, and the Beck Cognitive Insight Scale (BCIS) is
currently the only insight scale developed explicitly to assess cognitions related to insight, which
includes ability to reflect on unusual thoughts and experiences, ability to correct incorrect
judgments, certainty in those judgments, and jumping to conclusions (Beck et al., 2004).
Clinical and cognitive insight appear to be separate but related constructs (McCormack,
Tierney, Brennan, Lawlor, & Clarke, 2014). Indeed, clinical insight scales demonstrate moderate
to high correlations with each other, and low to moderate correlations with the BCIS, suggesting
that clinical and cognitive insight share some variance, but tap into different facets of insight
(Lincoln, et al., 2007; Riggs, Grant, Perivoliotis, & Beck, 2012). As such, clinical and cognitive
insight may be related to different cognitive processes.
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1.3

Insight in UHR
A few studies of insight in the UHR population have recently emerged, but none provide

definitive conclusions considering the nature of insight in these individuals. Lappin et al. (2007)
found individuals with at-risk mental state (ARMS; similar criteria to UHR) to have overall
impaired clinical insight, but with considerable variability. The ARMS group also had greater
insight than a first episode psychosis (FEP) group (67% versus 49% of total insight), which the
authors pointed out is consistent with cognitive models of psychosis that implicate impaired
symptom reappraisal in the development of psychosis (Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, Freeman, &
Bebbington, 2001). A review revealed that degree of clinical insight appears to follow a Ushaped curve along the lifespan of individuals with schizophrenia, with people most impaired at
the first psychotic episode and late in the disease and improvement with treatment in-between
(Philip Gerretsen, Plitman, Rajji, & Graff-Guerrero, 2014). This evidence suggests that insight
impairment may be a factor contributing to transition to psychosis, although more research is
required in the prodromal phase to support this hypothesis.
With the limited amount of cognitive insight research in UHR adolescents, it is also
unclear whether cognitive insight is impaired in this population or not, but it may be related to
delusion-like symptoms. In one of three studies to date, Kimhy et al. (2014) found that scores on
self-reflectiveness, self-certainty, and the cognitive insight composite did not differentiate UHR
and control groups and cognitive insight did not predict transition to psychosis. “Near threshold”
(rating of 5 on the SOPS) delusional symptoms were related so low self-reflectiveness and high
self-certainty in a subset of participants. Uchida et al. (2014) found individuals with ARMS to
have higher self-certainty than controls, and also found the composite to be negatively correlated
and self-certainty to be positively correlated with sub-threshold delusional symptoms. Similar
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results were observed in a sample of patients with chronic schizophrenia, in which patients with
delusions were more self-certain and less self-reflective than patients without delusions (Engh et
al., 2010). Delusions are characterized by inflexible, strongly held beliefs, which goes hand in
hand with self-certainty (Garety et al., 2001). Another study of UHR adolescents found selfcertainty to be associated with hallucinatory symptoms and self-reflectiveness and cognitive
insight to be associated with avolition (Lyngberg, Buchy, & Addington, 2015).
Based on disparate results of these few studies, it is still not clear if cognitive insight is
actually impaired prior to the onset of psychosis, associated with particular symptoms, or if it is a
risk factor for transition. However, based on the evidence thus far, there may be some association
between delusions and self-certainty prior to psychosis on set, and therefore perhaps those
individuals with higher self-certainty are more at risk.
1.4
1.4.1

Self-awareness and executive function as components of insight
Self-awareness
Studies of cognitive mechanisms related to impaired insight have increased

understanding of mechanisms involved in developing schizophrenia. One group proposed a
neurobiological model of insight in schizophrenia in which impaired insight is a function of
executive dysfunction and impaired self-awareness (Shad, Keshavan, Tamminga, Cullum, &
David, 2007). Self-awareness refers to an ability to distinguish self from other and make
decisions in regards to oneself, and deficits in self-awareness may underlie both impaired insight
and symptoms of psychosis (Shad, Brent, & Keshavan, 2011). For example, some people with
schizophrenia are able to label psychotic symptoms in others as pathological but not in
themselves, and may be unable to distinguish between self and other, monitor one’s own or
others’ internal states, or make meaningful social relationships (David, 1990; David, Bedford,
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Wiffen, & Gilleen, 2012; Nekovarova, Fajnerova, Horacek, & Spaniel, 2014; Shad et al., 2011;
van der Meer, Costafreda, Aleman, & David, 2010). Further, people with schizophrenia tend to
misestimate their abilities, a characteristic which predicts worse functioning.
1.4.2

Executive function
In addition to impaired self-awareness, executive dysfunction may contribute to poor

insight. Executive functions are a set of complex effortful processes generally comprised of
ability to flexibly adapt to one’s surroundings, inhibit inappropriate behavioral responses, and
monitor internal and external processes; they are largely controlled by prefrontal cortex (PFC)
systems (Diamond, 2013; Niendam et al., 2012). Executive functions are impaired in many
disorders, including schizophrenia, and Diamond (2013) noted that they are like a “canary in a
coal mine”—executive functions are often the first to suffer when something is physically or
mentally wrong. Thus, it is likely executive functions impact ability to recognize mental illness.
For instance, deficits in working memory or inflexible thinking may make it difficult to reappraise anomalous perceptual experiences or delusional beliefs and compare one’s own
functioning to others’ (Gilleen, Greenwood, & David, 2011; Shad et al., 2007).
Demonstrating these relationships, two meta-analyses have been conducted on
relationships between insight and cognitive measures. The first found clinical insight in 2,354
individuals (from 35 studies) with psychosis to be significantly associated with overall cognition
(r = .17), IQ (r = .14), executive function (r = .19), and Wisconsin Card Sort Test score (WCST;
a measure of mental flexibility; r = .23; (Aleman, Agrawal, Morgan, & David, 2006). The
correlations between clinical insight and WCST were significantly stronger than correlations
between clinical insight and IQ (medium effect size). More recently, Nair, Palmer, Aleman, and
David (2014) replicated Aleman et al. (2006) with added cognitive insight studies and found
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similar results. In 5429 individuals with psychosis from 72 studies, clinical insight was
significantly associated with total cognition (r = .16), memory (r = .13), working memory (r =
.13), executive function (r = .14), and WCST (r = .14). In 466 patients from 7 studies, cognitive
insight was significantly associated with total cognition (r = .18) and memory (r = .21), and selfcertainty was significantly associated with total cognition (r = -.14), IQ (r = -.19) and memory (r
= -.23).
While these effect sizes are small, they do indicate that executive function consistently
accounts for a significant amount of variance in insight. These meta-analyses do not, however,
dissociate different facets of clinical insight and executive functions and their relationships.
There are many tests of executive functions used in these studies that all tap into slightly
different processes, and working memory, inhibition, and flexibility all influence each other
(Diamond, 2013). Many different insight measures were used, as well, which each tap into
different dimensions of insight. Relationships between clinical insight and the WCST in the
meta-analyses suggest that poor mental flexibility is associated with inability to recognize one’s
illness, and relationships with memory indicate insight involves reflecting on past events or selfperceptions. However, the lack of relationships between neuropsychological variables and selfreflectiveness on the BCIS suggests that self-reflectiveness may be more closely related to selfawareness than cognition (Nair et al., 2014). It is also possible that these different aspects of
cognitive function interact with each other and insight.
1.4.3

Self-awareness and executive function in UHR
Self-related processes appear to be impaired in UHR populations, and may even be an

early indicator of psychosis risk (Brent et al., 2014). Nelson et al. (2012) found significantly
more self-disturbance in UHR adolescents than controls, and that self-disturbance predicted later
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transition to psychosis. However, another study found that clinical high risk adolescents’ selfratings of functioning significantly correlated with clinician ratings, which contrasts with the
tendency of people with chronic schizophrenia to misestimate their functioning (Olvet, Carrión,
Auther, & Cornblatt, 2013). Perhaps when individuals are UHR they are aware of functional
difficulties and strange experiences, but are less aware of the cause of these difficulties. Selfdisturbance may be a core deficit underlying transition to psychosis; individuals with psychosis
may either be predisposed to self-awareness difficulties that become apparent in adolescence, or
may experience a decline in self-awareness. Either way, self-awareness deficits may contribute
to symptom development and maintenance (Garety et al., 2001).
Cognitive impairments including executive dysfunction are also present before the first
episode of psychosis (Bang et al., 2014; Üçok et al., 2013). In fact, a decline in functioning is
one of the criteria for a UHR classification, which may be due to executive dysfunction in
activities of daily living, consistent with Diamond’s (2013) assertion that executive functions are
a sensitive early indication. Bang et al. (2014) found UHR cognitive test scores to be
intermediate to controls and FEP; attention/working memory and verbal memory differentiated
UHR from both FEP and controls. Additionally, Üçok et al. (2013) found cognitive function to
be lower than controls and similar among UHR, familial high risk, and first episode groups,
suggesting a genetic component. Generally, UHR and familial high-risk groups demonstrated
intermediate cognitive function relative to controls and FEP; compared to controls, the UHR
group performed significantly worse on learning/memory, executive function, attention, and
global cognition measures. Further, a large study of cognition in prodromal psychosis
demonstrated that in the early prodromal phase (before sub-threshold symptoms) there were
deficits in executive function and verbal memory, and even greater deficits in UHR individuals.
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The authors argued that their results are line with the neurodevelopmental model in which some
cognitive functions are already impaired before symptom onset and continue to decline
(Frommann et al., 2011).
Because of the cross-sectional nature of these studies, it cannot be concluded whether
UHR adolescence lose these skills or fail to keep up with their peers in skill development.
However, they do appear to have self-awareness and executive functioning difficulties prior to
symptom onset, suggesting early vulnerability. Overall, the evidence suggests that insight, selfawareness, and executive function are impaired prior to the onset of psychosis, but further study
in this area is warranted in order to disentangle these relationships because the literature is
mixed. Currently, there are no studies of insight and brain function in UHR individuals, but
neuroimaging studies of insight in schizophrenia are shedding light on the structures and
networks involved, including networks related to self-awareness and executive function. .
1.5

Neural Correlates of Insight
It is unlikely that focal brain abnormalities predispose people to psychosis—vulnerability

likely arises from disrupted function in distributed networks (Andreasen, Paradiso, & O’Leary,
1998; Friston, 1998; Fusar-Poli et al., 2007). Further, most researchers agree that insight deficits
are likely due, at least in part, to neurological dysfunction (Larøi, Barr, & Keefe, 2004). Menon
(2011) proposed a triple network dysfunction model of psychopathology in which
hyperconnectivity of the default mode network (DMN) and hypoconnectivity of the central
executive network (CEN), facilitated by aberrant switching between the two by the salience
network, underlie a variety of psychopathological symptoms. Nekovarova et al. (2014)
postulated that in schizophrenia specifically, hyperconnectivity of the DMN may underlie
positive symptoms and deficient self-awareness; in addition, hypoconnectivity of the CEN may
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underlie general cognitive and executive function impairment. These deficits may, in turn,
contribute to deficits in insight, in line with Shad’s (2007) model.
1.5.1

Networks hypothesized to be associated with insight
The DMN may be particularly relevant to insight, because parts of the DMN appear to

underlie self-referential thought (Northoff et al., 2006; Northoff & Bermpohl, 2004; Northoff &
Qin, 2011). Brain areas involved in the DMN include the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC),
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), precuneus/angular gyrus, and
lateral temporal lobes; these brain regions are active when a person is at rest, and deactivate
during tasks (Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008). Medial areas of the DMN also
overlap with the cortical midline structures (CMS), which are active during self-referential tasks
(Northoff et al., 2006; Schneider et al., 2008).
The mPFC and PCC appear to be especially important for self-reflection, and are active
during both self-reflection and rest (David et al., 2012; van der Meer et al., 2010; WhitfieldGabrieli et al., 2011). Whitfield-Gabrieli et al. (2011) discovered that the dorsomedial prefrontal
cortex (dmPFC) was active exclusively during a self-reflection task, whereas the PCC and
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC; nodes of the DMN) were active both during rest and
self-reflection. Additionally, a meta-analysis revealed that the ventral ACC was specifically
activated both at rest and during self-related tasks (Qin & Northoff, 2011). PCC activity also
coincided with the DMN and self-related tasks, but was active during other-related tasks as well
so was less specific, possibly indicating comparison of self with others. This evidence suggests
that nodes of networks active during self-reflection are able to be investigated during restingstate studies as well, and it is likely that self-reflection is occurring during rest.
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While midline structures may be more involved in self-referential processing, the lateral
prefrontal regions including the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) and ventrolateral
prefrontal cortex (vlPFC) are thought to be more involved in higher-order cognitive processing
that interacts with and regulates self-referential processing (Northoff et al., 2006; Qin &
Northoff, 2011). In line with this hypothesis, functional neuroimaging studies of insight and selfreflection tasks have implicated cortical midline regions as well as lateral prefrontal regions
(discussed below).
The CEN (also known as the task-positive or fronto-parietal network) consists of the
dlPFC and posterior parietal lobes and may be important for insight because it is associated with
goal-directed activities and executive functions, particularly attention and working memory (Dutt
et al., 2015; Niendam et al., 2012) . The CEN is normally anti-correlated with the DMN; once a
person begins performing an activity, the DMN switches off and the CEN switches on (Menon,
2011). Another cognitive control network affected in schizophrenia and possibly relevant to
insight is the cingulo-opercular network (CON), which overlaps with the salience network and is
comprised of the anterior insula/frontal inferior operculum (part of the vlPFC) and dorsal ACC
(Dosenbach et al., 2007). Whereas the CEN is more associated with flexibly adapting to task
demands, the CON is associated with sustained attention and attention to internal processes
(Dosenbach et al., 2006; van der Meer et al., 2010). It also appears that the anterior insula
facilitates switching between the DMN and CEN (Manoliu et al., 2014; Menon, 2011), and is
involved in general awareness and especially self-awareness (Craig, 2009). Additionally, the
cerebellum is functionally connected to all of these networks as an error detector and modulator
through cortico-cerebellar-thalamo-cortical loops, allowing cognition to be flexible and
automatic (discussed below) (Buckner, Krienen, Castellanos, Diaz, & Yeo, 2011).
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These three networks are hypothesized to be abnormal in many disorders, and have
particularly been associated with schizophrenia and UHR. Neuroimaging studies have also
demonstrated relationships between these networks and different facets of insight.
1.5.2

Insight and functional neuroimaging
Functional neuroimaging, and particularly functional connectivity (FC) can reveal how

these large scale networks are organized in relation to certain behavioral phenotypes. It is
thought that FC reveals organization of large-scale networks through correlating low frequency
oscillations of spatially distinct brain regions (Whitfield-Gabrieli & Ford, 2012). Few restingstate FC studies of clinical and cognitive insight have been conducted. First, Liemburg et al.
(2012) used independent components analysis (ICA), which linked lower connectivity within an
anterior DMN component and within a posterior DMN component to lower clinical insight.
However, they did not test connectivity between anterior and posterior DMN, which may be
more informative, as these regions likely work together as a network in self-reflection (Qin &
Northoff, 2011; Whitfield-Gabrieli et al., 2011).
In the second resting-state study of insight in schizophrenia, Gerretsen et al. (2014)
performed seed-based connectivity analyses with five networks of interest and found poorer
clinical insight to be associated with greater DMN connectivity between the PCC/precuneus and
left angular gyrus. ROI-to-ROI analysis revealed greater connectivity between the dmPFC (“selfreferential network”) and left insula with poorer clinical insight. They also found greater selfcertainty to be associated with reduced connectivity between the right inferior parietal lobule
(IPL; “dorsal attention network”) and left frontal inferior operculum. People with schizophrenia
tend to have higher self-certainty scores than healthy controls (Riggs et al., 2012), so this may be
associated with lower connectivity between cognitive control networks. Gerretsen et al.’s (2014)
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results suggest a role of cognitive control in cognitive insight and a role of self-referential
processing in clinical insight. They also attributed higher connectivity in the left hemisphere to
left hemisphere dominance and thus right hemisphere deficit, in line with one of their structural
MRI studies (Gerretsen et al., 2013). Right hemisphere lesions are associated with anosognosia
(Lehrer & Lorenz, 2014), so left hemisphere dominance supports the theory of insight deficits as
anosognosia. These resting-state studies suggest deficient processing in intrinsic networks in
those with impaired insight, but it is unclear in which direction these differences are and more
research is required to tease apart the networks’ relationships with each other and with clinical
and cognitive insight.
Task-based studies of insight and self-reflection in schizophrenia have implicated both
midline and left lateral prefrontal regions, as well. For instance, one study demonstrated
hyperconnectivity from the IPL, PCC, and dmPFC toward the vmPFC in schizophrenia patients
with impaired clinical insight; they also showed hyperconnectivity between the PCC and vmPFC
particularly when patients with poor clinical insight were making judgments about themselves
(Ćurčić-Blake, van der Meer, Pijnenborg, David, & Aleman, 2015). Shad et al. (2012) also found
greater posterior DMN and cerebellum activation in people with chronic schizophrenia compared
to controls during self-versus other reflection; further, using the same task, Shad and Keshavan
(2015) found unawareness of symptoms in individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia to be
associated with activation during self-versus other reflection in the left frontal inferior
operculum, left lingual gyrus, and left inferior parietal lobule. van der Meer et al. (2013) found
that greater activation during self-reflection in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) was
associated with greater self-reflectiveness, suggesting the vmPFC underlies both the act of selfreflection and self-reflectiveness measured by the BCIS. A recent study also implicated the
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vlPFC in self-reflectiveness in healthy controls and in first episode psychosis during source
memory retrieval (Buchy et al., 2014; Buchy, Hawco, Joober, Malla, & Lepage, 2015).
Again, the DMN is most often associated with self-reflection tasks, and this relationship
seems to hold for resting-state studies as well. Lateral hemispheric regions involved in the CEN
and CON are active during self-reflection, as well as executive function. van der Meer (2013)
suggested that vlPFC deficits may indicate impairment in cognitive control of self-related
processes such as integrating internal and external stimuli; therefore if the vlPFC is not
functioning properly, individuals with schizophrenia may have difficulties integrating a personal
narrative.
1.6

Aberrant Brain Function in Ultra High-Risk Adolescents
These networks that are likely associated with different facets of insight have been

identified as potentially dysfunctional in UHR adolescents. Though still in its infancy,
investigating brain connectivity in adolescents at UHR for schizophrenia has enabled researchers
to understand schizophrenia as a neurodevelopmental disconnection disorder (Satterthwaite &
Baker, 2015). During adolescence, the brain goes through many changes in network organization
(Menon, 2013). Menon (2013) posited principles of functional brain network development:
strengthening of long-range connections, reconfiguration of cortical-subcortical connections,
dynamic pruning of over-connected pathways, and reconfiguration of functional connections
within and between large-scale networks. Developmental changes may make the adolescent
brain particularly vulnerable to psychosis if any of these processes are compromised. Brent et al.
(2014) also argued that self-related deficits in the prodromal phase of schizophrenia are related to
these structural and functional changes, especially in the prefrontal cortex, since this is the last
brain area to fully develop.
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1.6.1

Default mode network
Aberrant DMN function has been implicated in neuroimaging studies of schizophrenia

(Garrity et al., 2007; Whitfield-Gabrieli et al., 2009; Whitfield-Gabrieli & Ford, 2012), and more
recent studies have found the DMN to be dysfunctional in the prodromal phase of psychosis as
well. One resting-state fMRI study of connectivity in a UHR sample found hyperconnectivity in
the DMN compared to controls, which is consistent with the majority of research in
schizophrenia (Shim et al., 2010). In addition, Shim and colleagues (2010) and Wotruba et al.
(2013) found reduced anti-correlations between the DMN and CEN, suggesting that the DMN
and CEN are not efficiently activating and deactivating during rest, respectively. Wotruba and
colleagues (2013) also found the lack of anticorrelations between these networks to be related to
reality distortions, and higher inter-network connectivity to be related to worse cognitive
performance. Similar to UHR studies, Satterthwaite et al. (2015) observed DMN
hyperconnectivity during resting-state in youth from the general population with psychosis
spectrum symptoms, suggesting that DMN hyperconnectivity may predispose people to
psychotic symptoms, whether or not these individuals are help-seeking. However, a different
group observed DMN hypoconnectivity in a similar sample (Orr, Turner, & Mittal, 2014), and a
recent study utilizing some of the same participants as the current study found no connectivity
differences within the DMN but increased connectivity between the salience network and DMN
(Pelletier-Baldelli, Bernard, & Mittal, 2015). These studies suggest potential major network
connectivity abnormalities across the psychosis spectrum, but as methods and study samples
vary, it is not entirely clear in which direction the abnormalities are.
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1.6.2

Cognitive control networks
Many task-based fMRI studies show abnormal CEN activity in UHR individuals, but

findings have been mixed (Dutt et al., 2015; Fusar-Poli et al., 2007). Dutt and colleagues (2015)
integrated studies in an ALE analysis and found regions of the CEN to be hypoactivated during
cognitive tasks (mainly working memory and verbal fluency) compared to controls. In particular,
the right inferior parietal lobule showed lower activation across all cognitive tasks studied,
illustrating that this region may be particularly vulnerable during the development of psychosis.
The left dmPFC was another common area of decreased activation during cognitive tasks. As
previously mentioned, both of these areas are parts of networks hypothesized to be involved in
insight and the right parietal lobe is associated with anosognosia in other disorders (Prigatano,
2010).
Functional connectivity studies of the CEN and CON are less common in UHR, but
Schmidt et al. (2014) found both decreased fronto-parietal connectivity, especially in the right
hemisphere, and impaired working memory performance in individuals with ARMS. Greater
right hemisphere differences between ARMS and healthy controls echo the left hemisphere
dominance theory of insight impairment, Further, Schmidt et al. (2015) discovered in their
review that the fronto-parietal network is disrupted throughout different stages of psychosis,
though it is unclear what the pattern of disruption looks like.
Two studies have also observed decreased cingulo-opercular connectivity in community
samples of adolescents with psychosis spectrum symptoms (Orr et al., 2014; Satterthwaite et al.,
2015), providing evidence for hypoconnectivity in cognitive control networks during rest along
the psychosis continuum. Orr et al. (2014) also observed that connectivity within the CEN was
stronger in their non-clinical psychosis group compared to healthy controls, which contrasts with
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UHR studies. This could indicate a compensatory mechanism in non-help-seeking individuals
that is not present once sub-threshold symptoms develop (Schmidt et al. 2015). Orr et al. (2014)
also observed reduced connectivity in cerebellar networks.
1.6.3

Cerebellar networks
While most studies of functional connectivity are cortically-focused, Bernard and

colleagues (2014) recently found adolescents at risk for psychosis to have decreased cerebellocortical connectivity compared to healthy controls. The cerebellum is anatomically and
intrinsically connected to the cortex, and particularly to regions in the DMN, CEN, and CON,
both in healthy individuals (Buckner, 2013; Buckner et al., 2011; Krienen & Buckner, 2009), and
in schizophrenia (Chen et al., 2013). It is hypothesized to create “internal models” that predict
and then help modulate and coordinate behavior (Ito, 2008). The cerebellum may be an
important node involved in functional dysconnectivity in psychosis, but it remains
underinvestigated (Andreassen et al., 1998). According to an ALE analysis, cerebellar regions
that appear to be most hypoconnected to the cortex in schizophrenia are crus I and lobule VI,
which are involved in diverse cognitive processes, including executive function and selfreflection (Bernard & Mittal, 2015; Buckner et al., 2011).
The cerebellum is involved in many complex cognitive processes, including executive
function and working memory; the posterior regions of the cerebellum (crus I/II, lobules VI/VII)
appear to be especially important for these types of tasks (Keren-Happuch, Chen, Ho, &
Desmond, 2014). Because it is involved in these complex cognitions, the cognitive dysmetria
hypothesis posits that in disorders such as schizophrenia, the cerebellum is not properly
coordinating and refining thought based on the situation, resulting in disorganized thought
processes (Andreasen et al., 1998). These deficits could have consequences for insight and
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development of psychotic symptoms if cerebellar dysfunction impairs integrating and updating
one’s personal narrative and cognitive control. In fact, preliminary evidence from the author’s
lab suggests weaker crus I – prefrontal cortex connectivity in individuals with low insight.
Further, the posterior cerebellum, including crus I, was associated with error detection when
activated with the CEN and CON (Dosenbach, Fair, Cohen, Schlaggar, & Petersen, 2008),
suggesting that when these circuits are not functioning properly, individuals may be prone to
errors in judgment.
Cerebellar abnormalities have been observed in UHR adolescents. Structurally, Dean et
al. (2013) demonstrated that cerebellar volumes of both motor and cognitive regions were
smaller in UHR compared to controls, and that left crus I volume correlated with procedural
learning rate, which was slower in UHR. In addition, Mittal and colleagues (2013) found
cerebellar-thalamic white matter tract integrity to decrease over a year in UHR, but increase in
controls; the white matter tract integrity was predicted by presence of neurological soft signs and
negative symptoms, which were increased in UHR. The posterior cerebellum is connected to the
cortex through the thalamus (Barch, 2014), so integrity of these tracts may be crucial for correct
modulation of cognitive and motor processes. Bernard and colleagues (2014) also demonstrated
decreased cerbello-cortical connectivity in UHR adolescents compared to controls. Because
studies have found parts of the cerebellum to be associated with psychotic symptoms, cognition,
and insight, it is worth investigating it in its own right. The posterior cerebellum appears to be
especially important for diverse cognitive functions, and crus I in particular appears to be
associated with multiple cortical networks and cognitive processes. Therefore, crus I may be
related to insight through organizing and coordinating thoughts about the self.
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1.7

Aims of This Study
The literature reviewed thus far provides evidence that insight in schizophrenia is related

to self-awareness and executive functions, which are associated with distributed brain networks.
These networks appear to be dysfunctional in schizophrenia as well as the prodromal phase of
schizophrenia, and there is limited evidence for insight deficits in prodromal psychosis as well.
Both insight and functional connectivity remain understudied in this population, but may be risk
factors for developing psychosis and may even help predict transition. Therefore, this study aims
to investigate brain networks involved in clinical and cognitive insight in UHR adolescents.
Regions of interest (ROIs) will be defined in the DMN, CEN, CON, and cerebellum crus I to
calculate connectivity within and between these networks and relate it to insight dimensions.
Aim 1: The first aim is to characterize the nature of cognitive insight dimensions in UHR
adolescents compared to healthy controls, thus adding to the extant literature on cognitive insight
in UHR.
Hypothesis 1a: UHR adolescents will display higher self-certainty than healthy controls.
Hypothesis 1b: UHR adolescents will display lower self-reflectiveness than healthy
controls.
Hypothesis 1c: UHR adolescents will display lower cognitive insight than healthy
controls.
Aim 2: The second aim is to investigate how cognitive insight dimensions are associated
with connectivity in default mode and cognitive control networks. Because cognitive insight
does not directly measure experiences related mental illness, it was assessed in both UHR and
control groups, therefore relationships between cognitive insight dimensions and connectivity
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will be calculated for all participants. I will also investigate a Group  Cognitive Insight
Dimension interaction.
Hypothesis 2a: Greater self-reflectiveness will be associated with greater connectivity
between the PCC and vmPFC, and between right crus I and the PCC.
Hypothesis 2b: Greater self-certainty will be associated with lower connectivity between
the right dlPFC and right posterior parietal lobe, between the right dlPFC and left crus I, and
between left crus I and the right anterior insula/frontal operculum.
Hypothesis 2c: Greater cognitive insight will be associated with greater connectivity
between the PCC and vmPFC, between right crus I and the PCC, between left crus I and the right
dlPFC, between left crus I and the right anterior insula/frontal operculum, and between the right
dlPFC and right posterior parietal lobe.
Hypothesis 2d: There will be a significant Group  Cognitive Insight Dimension
interaction for all analyses.
Aim 3: The third aim is to investigate how clinical insight is associated with connectivity
in default mode and cognitive control networks. The clinical insight scores were only assessed in
the UHR group. The two resting-state studies of insight and the DMN thus far oppose each other
and utilized different methods, so it may be premature to propose directional hypotheses in
relation to the DMN (Gerretsen et al., 2014; Liemburg et al., 2012), but previous research from
our lab indicates lower connectivity in the DMN is associated with lower insight. Because the
proposed analyses are similar to Gerretsen and colleagues’ (2014) analyses and are using some
of the same ROIs, a comparison between our UHR results and their chronic schizophrenia results
may be possible.
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Hypothesis 3a: Greater clinical insight will be associated with greater connectivity
between the PCC and vmPFC, between right crus I and the PCC, between left crus I and the right
dlPFC, between left crus I and the right anterior insula/frontal operculum, and between the right
dlPFC and right posterior parietal lobe.
Hypothesis 3b: Greater clinical insight will be associated with greater anticorrelations
between the right dlPFC and PCC.
Exploring dimensions of insight and their neurofunctional correlates in adolescents at UHR
for psychosis will broaden knowledge of psychosis development. If insight is related to brain
networks in this population, this may enable clinicians to identify who is most at risk of
psychosis and develop more effective interventions to prevent psychosis.

2
2.1

METHODS

Procedures
The data used for this project were obtained from an ongoing study at the University of

Colorado Boulder. Obtainment of data and analyses were approved by the Georgia State
University institutional review board (IRB #H15274).
2.1.1

Participants
Participants were recruited from the University of Colorado Boulder’s Adolescent

Development and Preventative Treatment (ADAPT) research program, through Vijay Mittal,
PhD and colleagues. Control participants were recruited from the community. All participants
gave informed consent, and all procedures were reviewed and approved by the University of
Colorado Boulder institutional review board. Participants consisted of 130 adolescents, ages 1223.
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The UHR group was screened with the Structured Interview for Prodromal Syndromes
(SIPS) by an advanced doctoral student or clinical psychologist (Miller et al., 1999), and those
who met criteria for a prodromal syndrome were included. All interviewers received reliability
training, and reliability was assessed periodically for drift; all raters had inter-rater reliabilities
that exceeded the minimum study criterion of Kappa  80. Help-seeking individuals who did not
meet criteria were referred to community resources. The SIPS contains the Scale of PsychosisRisk Symptoms (SOPS), which contains items on a scale of 0 – 6 for severity of positive,
negative, and disorganized symptoms. Scores of 3 – 5 are considered prodromal. It also contains
a family history worksheet, Global Assessment of Functioning Scale, and Schizotypal
Personality Disorder Checklist. As per the SIPS, adolescents were considered UHR if they had
moderate positive symptoms and/or a decline in functioning accompanied by schizotypal traits
and/or a family history of schizophrenia (Figure 1).
Exclusion criteria for the UHR group included history of head injury, diagnosis of an
Axis I psychotic disorder, neurological disorder, or MRI contraindication. Exclusion criteria for
the control group further included any Axis I diagnosis and psychotic disorder in a first-degree
relative (this confers genetic risk). To assess these criteria, a trained advanced doctoral student or
clinical psychologist administered the Structured Clinical Interview for Axis I DSM-IV
Disorders (SCID) (First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 1997)
Eight participants were excluded from these analyses because they did not meet criteria
for UHR or control groups, ten because they were under age 14 and behavioral measures were
not normed for younger children, and two had previously been diagnosed with a psychotic
disorder. This left a total of 110 participants for behavioral analyses (55 UHR and 55 controls).
Participants were excluded from imaging analyses for the following reasons: six were under age
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16, seven had current substance dependence, three were not scanned, six did not have sufficient
scan quality, and five moved in the scanner more than the 3 mm voxel size (see below for image
preprocessing pipeline). Due to further missing data, final imaging analyses included 35 UHR in
clinical insight analyses and 24 UHR and 33 controls in cognitive insight analyses. Table 2
presents participant characteristics for the entire sample. Tables 24 and 25 in Appendix E show
demographic information for subsets of participants with imaging data.
2.1.2

Insight measures
Insight was assessed with the abbreviated version of the Scale to Assess Unawareness of

Mental Disorder (SUMD) (David, 1990; Michel et al., 2013) and the Beck Cognitive Insight
Scale (BCIS) (Beck et al., 2004). The SUMD was used to assess the UHR group because they
are help-seeking individuals who have had experiences similar to psychosis; the BCIS was used
to assess both the UHR and control group for comparison because it does not directly assess
psychotic experiences and has been normed in healthy individuals (Martin, Warman, & Lysaker,
2010).
The SUMD is a clinician-rated measure of insight. It includes three general items:
awareness of having a mental disorder, awareness of the need for treatment, and awareness of
social consequences of the disorder. These items are rated on a scale of 0 – 5 for current
awareness and past awareness: 0) the item cannot be assessed, 1) aware, 3) somewhat
aware/unaware, and 5) completely unaware. The SUMD also includes items related to specific
symptoms—both awareness of symptoms and attribution in the past and present. (Michel et al.,
2013) assessed the psychometric properties of the abbreviated SUMD in 531 patients with
schizophrenia. They confirmed that awareness of disease, need for treatment, and consequences
loaded on a single factor. Internal consistency was above .7 and convergent validity was
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established with relationship with the PANSS insight item. SUMD scores did not significantly
correlate with depression, quality of life, or demographic factors, indicating discriminant
validity. The SUMD items assessed in this study include the three general items and the items for
awareness and attribution of thought disorder.
The BCIS is a self-report measure of cognitive insight. It includes two subscales: selfreflectiveness (SR; 9 items) and self-certainty (SC; 6 items). Each item is rated by the patient as
0) do not agree at all, 1) agree slightly, 2) agree a lot, or 3) agree completely. The selfreflectiveness subscale items all assess the patient’s ability to reflect on their cognitive processes
and perceptual experiences. The self-certainty subscale items assess beliefs around cognitions
being correct and accepting corrective feedback from others.
In studies of cognitive insight, each subscale is typically used separately as well as a
composite score derived from subtracting self-certainty from self-reflectiveness. Beck’s original
study assessed psychometrics in 150 inpatients (75 with schizophrenia and 75 with depression).
Varimax-rotated principal components analysis revealed two factors: SC and SR. Internal
consistency values ranged from .59 to .67, which are acceptable for research according to the
authors, but low. The BCIS composite correlated with the SUMD awareness of mental disorder,
indicating convergent validity. However, the BCIS did not correlate as highly with clinical
insight measures as clinical insight measures correlated with each other, which indicates that
cognitive insight appears to be a separate, but related construct to clinical insight (Lincoln et al.,
2007). Beck et al. (2004) also found support for significant differences in BCIS scores between
the patients with and without psychosis. In addition, Martin et al. (2010) assessed psychometrics
of the BCIS in a healthy sample, finding the same two factors. Internal consistency values were
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above .70, and there were significant differences between patients and healthy controls (patients
reported higher self-certainty, lower self-reflectiveness, and lower composite scores).
To get scores for current clinical insight, responses to the three current general items
were summed. Cronbach’s alpha in the current sample for this scale was 0.36, which is low,
however it was higher when only including subjects with imaging data (0.52). BCIS responses
for self-reflectiveness and self-certainty items were summed, and self-certainty was subtracted
from self-reflectiveness in order to get the cognitive insight composite score. Cronbach’s Alpha
in the current sample for the self-reflectiveness scale was 0.72, and for self-certainty was 0.57.
For the group included in imaging analysis, Cronbach’s alpha for self-reflectiveness was 0.73,
and for self-certainty it was 0.41. Three participants did not answer the last BCIS question, so
their scores were imputed in the following way: their scores on other items were inspected and
compared to their nearest neighbor, then they were given the same score on item 15 that their
nearest neighbor reported. Excluding these three imputed data points did not impact results.
2.1.3

Scanning
Participants underwent both structural and functional magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)

scans on a 3T Siemens Magnetom TrioTim scanner. Structural images were acquired with a T1weighted 3D magnetization prepared rapid gradient multi-echo sequence (MPRAGE; sagittal
plane; repetition time [TR] = 2,530 ms; echo times [TE] = 1.64 ms, 3.5 ms, 5.36 ms, 7.22 ms,
9.08 ms; GRAPPA parallel imaging factor of 2; 1 mm3 isomorphic voxels, 192 interleaved
slices; FOV = 256 mm; flip angle 57°). A 5 min 34 s functional resting state blood-oxygen-leveldependent scan was acquired with a T2*-weighted echo-planar functional protocol (number of
volumes = 165; TR = 2,000 ms; TE = 29 ms; matrix size = 64 x 64 x 33; FA = 75°; 3.8 x 3.x 3
3.5 mm3 voxels; 33 interleaved slices; FOV = 240 mm). During the resting state scan,
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participants were instructed to relax and close their eyes. A turbo spin echo proton density
(PD)/T2-weighted acquisition (TSE; axial oblique aligned with anterior commissure–posterior
commissure line; TR = 3,720 ms; TE = 89 ms; GRAPPA parallel imaging factor of 2; FOV =
240 mm; flip angle: 120 ; 0.9 x 0.9 mm2 voxels; 77 interleaved 1.5 mm slices) was acquired to
check for incidental pathology.
2.1.4

Preprocessing
Data were preprocessed using the Data Processing Assistant for Resting State fMRI,

Advanced Edition (DPARSFA) (Yan & Zang, 2010). The first four time points were removed,
and then scans were slice-timing corrected, motion corrected, and co-registered to the T1 image.
The images were then normalized to MNI space, smoothed with a 6 mm Gaussian kernel. After
smoothing, nuisance covariates were regressed out: white matter, cerebrospinal fluid, head
motion scrubbing regressors (framewise displacement (FD) > 0.5, two volumes before, and one
volume after the bad time point), and 12 motion parameters. Finally, images were temporally
filtered (0.01 – 0.08 Hz).
2.2
2.2.1

Analyses
Aim 1: Cognitive Insight dimensions
First, independent samples t-tests and chi-square tests were calculated to compare the

UHR and control groups on demographic measures using the Statistical Package for the Social
Sciences (SPSS; version 21). Then, independent samples t-tests were calculated to compare
cognitive insight between the UHR and control groups. Tests were carried out with group as the
independent variable and self-reflectiveness, self-certainty, and cognitive insight as dependent
variables. The Bonferroni method was used to correct for multiple comparisons, and group
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comparisons were considered significant if they passed a threshold of p < .017. Pearson’s
bivariate correlations were also performed between insight measures and clinical and cognitive
measures in the UHR group to investigate potential covariates in regression analyses. Significant
correlations were plotted to examine scatter and potential leverage points that influenced
correlations, and measures were tested as covariates if they correlated strongly with both the
independent and dependent variables.
2.2.2

Aims 2 and 3: Functional connectivity
Functional connectivity (FC) analyses investigate how low frequency fluctuations in

blood-oxygen level dependent (BOLD) signal in two spatially distinct regions are functionally
related by calculating a bivariate correlation (Biswal, Yetkin, Haughton, & Hyde, 1995). One
method for calculating FC, seed-based connectivity, involves choosing a seed region of interest
(ROI) in the brain and correlating its BOLD signal to other voxels in the brain. Seed-based
connectivity was calculated in DPARSFA using seeds in the DMN, CEN, CON, and a cerebellar
seed related to these networks. Table 1 demonstrates the seeds of interest within each network,
which were defined by 10 mm spheres centered on coordinates used in Orr et al.’s (2014) study.
Seeds in the cerebellum were defined by masks created with the Spatially Unbiased
Infratentorial Template (SUIT) atlas (Diedrichson, 2006) in order to improve spatial alignment
(Bernard et al., 2014). As identified by previous research (Buckner et al., 2011; Chen et al.,
2013; Dosenbach et al., 2008), crus I was defined as an ROI because it appears to be connected
to all networks of interest and associated with both cognition and self-reflection.
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Table 1 Seeds of interest, defined by Orr et al. (2014). Seeds in bold will be used for seed-tovoxel analyses.
Network

Region of Interest

MNI Coordinates

Default Mode Network

PCC

-11, -57, 13

vmPFC

1, 31, -2

R dlPFC

43, 22, 34

R inferior parietal lobule

51, -47, 42

Cingulo-Opercular Network

R anterior insula/frontal operculum

36, 16, 4

Cerebellum

L/R Crus I

Defined by SUIT atlas

Control seed

L Primary Visual Cortex

-7, -83, 2

Central Executive Network

Additionally, a control seed was included in order to specify that any results obtained are
indeed related to insight and not just a generally dysfunctional brain. The control seed was
located in the primary visual cortex because it is not functionally connected to the DMN or CEN
and the participants had their eyes closed during the scan. It was expected that the activity of this
ROI was not significantly correlated with the other ROIs.
DPARSFA calculates correlations between seed regions of interest (ROIs) and all of the
voxels in the brain (seed-to-voxel approach) and between ROIs (ROI-to-ROI approach). For
seed-to-voxel calculations, the correlations are converted into z maps with Fisher’s r to z
transformation. For ROI-to-ROI calculations, DPARSFA creates a matrix of FC z scores for each
participant. Similar to Gerrestsen et al. (2014), I investigated both seed-to-voxel and ROI-to-ROI
connectivity. While ROI-to-ROI analyses were hypothesis driven (see hypotheses), seed-tovoxel analyses were more exploratory and included the PCC, right dlPFC, and right and left crus
I. In keeping with Gerretsen’s theory that insight is right hemisphere related, and to reduce
multiple comparisons, I focused on right hemisphere cortical ROIs and left crus I.
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2.2.3

General Linear Model analyses
For ROI-to-ROI analyses, SPSS was used to perform multiple linear regression analyses

on connectivity values between ROIs. Insight dimensions (and group, for cognitive insight
analyses) were entered as predictor variables and FC correlations were the outcome variables.
Framewise displacement (FD), a measure of mean head motion, was included as a covariate in
regression analyses, in order to control for effects of head motion on FC (Power et al., 2014). For
those covariates that correlated with both the dependent and independent variables, analyses
were re-run with covariates included as a post-hoc analysis.
Because the clinical insight measures are only available for the UHR group, analyses
with clinical insight items were only performed within this group. Cognitive insight analyses
were performed with all participants for whom cognitive insight scores were available, and a
group × cognitive insight dimension interaction term was included. Results were considered
significant if they passed a threshold of p < .05, Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons
for each hypothesis.
For seed-to-voxel analyses, SPM8 (http//www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) was used to perform
voxel-wise multiple linear regression analyses on the FC maps. When investigating interaction
effects, the flexible factorial model was used, with group as a factor, FD as a covariate, and selfreflectiveness or self-certainty as a covariate of interest. When investigating main effects,
multiple linear regression was used, with FD as a covariate and cognitive or clinical insight
dimension as a covariate of interest. A cluster-forming threshold of p < .001, extent threshold 10
voxels was set, and resulting clusters were considered significant if they passed a cluster-level
threshold of p < .05, familywise error (FWE) corrected for multiple comparisons.
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3
3.1

RESULTS

Participants
Participants did not differ in age (t(108) = -0.10, p = .921), handedness (χ² = 0.25, p =

.673), race (χ² = 4.73, p > .05), IQ (t(83) = 1.50, p = .138), mother’s (t(97.18) = -0.53, p = .597)
or father’s (t(104) = 0.97, p = .334) education, or framewise displacement (FD) (t(68) = -0.23, p
= .817). The UHR group contained significantly more males than the control group (χ² = 5.28, p
= .022), consistent with the schizophrenia literature. However, for imaging analyses, the subset
included did not differ in gender between groups. UHR had significantly lower general
functioning (M = 60.06, SD = 16.41) than controls (M = 86.19, SD = 5.60; t(65.18) = -11.07 p <
.001). Within the subset of participants used in imaging analyses, there was a significant
difference in IQ, with the UHR group (M = 111.31, SD = 12.55) performing better than the
control group (M = 104.92, SD = 10.26; t(53) = 2.05, p = .045. IQ was not included as a
covariate because it is not recommended to do so in neurodevelopmental studies (Dennis et al.,
2009), and it did not significantly predict connectivity. Table 2 illustrates group differences for
the entire sample, and Table 24 illustrates group differences for the imaging subset.
In regards to symptomatology, the UHR group displayed average SIPS scores of 11.69 ±
5.82 for positive symptoms, 9.69 ± 6.72 for negative symptoms, 5.05 ± 3.86 for disorganized
symptoms, and 6.60 ± 4.54 for general symptoms. UHR displayed a range of clinical insight,
with mean awareness of mental disorder of 2.10 (SD = 1.42), mean awareness of effects of
medication of 1.10 (SD = 1.56), and mean awareness of consequences of 1.73 (SD = 1.55).
According to the awareness of mental disorder item, 30 participants were considered “aware”
(score of 2 or below), and 22 were considered “somewhat aware” to “unaware”. Mean sum
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clinical insight scores ranged from 0 – 12, with a mean of 4.92 and standard deviation of 3.00.
Higher scores on this measure indicate more impaired insight.
Table 2 Participant Characteristics.
Healthy Control
(N = 55)

UHR
(N = 55 )

Tests

Significance

19.31 ± 2.13

19.27 ± 1.66

t = -0.10

.921

Gender (M/F)

24/31

36/19

χ² = 5.28

.022

Handedness (R/L)

31/3

33/2

χ² = 0.25

.673

Race (White/Non-White)

25/19

31/13

χ² = 1.77

.268

WRAT Sum IQ

104.95 ± 10.28

108.70 ± 12.63

t = 1.50

.138

Framewise Displacement
(N = 33/37)

0.200 ± 0.071

0.195 ± 0.092

t = -0.23

.815

Mother’s Education

16.02 ± 2.78

15.77 ± 1.96

t = -0.53

.597

Father’s Education

15.20 ± 3.73

15.85 ± 3.05

t = 0.97

.334

GAF Current

86.19 ± 5.60

60.06 ± 16.41

t = -11.07

< .001

Age

Positive Symptoms

11.69 ± 5.82

Negative Symptoms

9.69 ± 6.72

Disorganized Symptoms

5.05 ± 3.856

General Symptoms

6.60 ± 4.54

Awareness of Mental Disorder

2.10 ± 1.42

Awareness of Medication
Effects
Awareness of Social
Consequences
Total Clinical Insight

1.10 ± 1.56
1.73 ± 1.55
4.92 ± 3.00

Note, GAF, General Assessment of Functioning

3.2

Cognitive Insight
UHR (M = 13.66, SD = 4.05) displayed greater self-reflectiveness than controls (M =

9.00, SD = 3.15; t(73) = 5.61, p < .001). They also displayed greater cognitive insight than
controls (UHR M = 5.67 SD = 5.59, control M = 2.14, SD = 4.04; t(73) = 3.50, p = .001). The
two groups did not differ in self-certainty (t(73) = 1.58, p = .224). When three items asking about
“unusual experience” were removed from the self-reflectiveness scale, the group difference was
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still significant t(73) = 4.29, p < .001. Acording to Cohen’s d, the effect size for the selfreflectiveness difference is large (1.28), as is the effect size for cognitive insight (0.797). The
effect size for the self-certainty difference is small (0.286).
In regards to correlation analyses, within the UHR group the cognitive insight composite
significantly correlated with self-reflectiveness (r(32) = .853, p < .001) and self-certainty (r(32)
= -.681, p < .001). Cognitive insight did not significantly correlate with any other clinical or
cognitive measures. Clinical insight significantly correlated with positive (r(52) = .465, p = .001)
and negative symptoms (r(52) = .318, p = .022). Self-reflectiveness significantly correlated with
social cognition (r(27) = .424, p = .027), and IQ (r(25) = .426, p = .034). Self-certainty
significantly correlated with working memory (r(27) = .382, p = .049) and negative symptoms
(r(32) = -.432, p = .014). All correlations did not survive correction for multiple comparisons (p
< .001), and many were influenced by leverage points that made correlations nonsignificant
when removed. See Appendix A for all correlations.
Table 3 Cognitive Insight differences.
Control
(N = 43)

UHR
(N = 32)

Test

Significance

Self-Reflectiveness

9.00 ± 3.15

13.66 ± 4.05

t = 5.61

< .001

Self-Certainty

6.86 ± 2.98

7.70 ± 2.89

t = 1.22

.224

Cognitive Insight

2.14 ± 4.04

5.95 ± 5.42

t = 3.50

.001

Note, UHR, ultra high-risk

3.3
3.3.1

ROI-to-ROI Connectivity
Self-reflectiveness and DMN
ROI – ROI regression results indicated a significant group  self-reflectiveness

interaction within the DMN, adjusted R2 = .182, F(4, 52) = 4.12, p = .006; interaction B = -.228, t
= -2.5, p = .016. The interaction accounted for 9.1% of the variance in DMN connectivity.
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Simple slopes analysis indicated that the slope of the regression line for the UHR group
significantly differed from zero (B = -.176, t = -2.93, p = .005), but the slope of the regression
line for the control group did not (B = .052, t = .768, p = .446). Table 4 and Figure 2 illustrate the
significant results. Because positive symptoms and depressive symptoms correlated with both
self-reflectiveness and DMN connectivity, the regression was tested with symptoms as covariates
and the regression remained significant, adjusted R2 = .170, F(6, 50) = 2.91, p = .016. The
model investigating connectivity between right crus I and PCC/precuneus was not significant.
All nonsignificant regression models are reported in Appendix A.
Table 4 Hierarchical regression for self-reflectiveness (SR) and group predicting default mode
network connectivity.
Predictor
B
t
p
Step 1
FD
.080
2.09
.041
Step 2
FD
.076
2.03
.047
SR
-.076
-1.62
.111
Group
.201
2.13
.038
Step 3
FD
.090
2.49
.016
SR
.052
.768
.446
Group
.205
2.27
.027
Group  SR
-.228
-2.50
.016
Note, FD, framewise displacement; SR, self-reflectiveness

R2
.074

F
4.38

p
.041

.076

3.10

0.34

.091

4.12

.006
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Figure 2 Scatterplot of connectivity values and self-reflectiveness by group,
illustrating the significant group  self-reflectiveness interaction for ROI-to-ROI connectivity
between the posterior cingulate and ventromedial prefrontal cortex.

3.3.2

Self-certainty and CEN, CON
The model for self-certainty predicting left crus I – right dlPFC connectivity was

significant, adjusted R2 = .27, F(4, 52) = 6.23, p < .001. The group  self-certainty interaction
accounted for 8.9% of the variance in connectivity, B = -.171, t = 2.62, p = .011. Simple slopes
analysis indicated that the slope of the regression line for the UHR group significantly differed
from zero (B = -.111, t = -2.00, p = .05), but the slope of the regression line for the control group
did not (B = .059, t = 1.73, p = .089). Table 5 and Figure 3 illustrate the significant results.

35

Table 5 Hierarchical regression for self-certainty (SC) and group predicting left crus I – right
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex connectivity.
Predictor
B
t
Step 1
FD
-.119
-3.97
Step 2
FD
-.120
-3.92
SC
.013
.413
Group
-.052
-.848
Step 3
FD
-.121
-4.17
SC
.059
1.73
Group
-.039
-.672
-.171
-2.62
Group  SC
Note, FD, framewise displacement; SC, self-certainty

p

R2
.223

F
15.79

p
.000

.012

5.42

.003

.089

6.24

.000

.000
.000
.681
.400
.000
.089
.505
.011

Figure 3 Scatterplot of connectivity values and self-certainty by group,
illustrating the significant group  self-certainty interaction for ROI-to-ROI connectivity
between the left crus I and right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC).
The model for self-certainty predicting left crus I – right anterior insula/frontal operculum
connectivity was significant, adjusted R2 = .17, F(4, 52) = 3.87, p = .008. The group  SC
interaction accounted for 13.8% of the variance in connectivity, B = -.196, t = -3.06, p = .004.
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Simple slopes analysis indicated that the slope of the regression line for the UHR group
significantly differed from zero (B = -.168, t = -3.07, p = .003), but the slope of the regression
line for the control group did not (B = .028, t = .821, p = .416). Table 6 and Figure 4 illustrate the
significant results. Because negative symptoms correlated with both self-certainty and
connectivity, the regression was tested with negative symptoms as a covariate and the regression
remained significant, adjusted R2 = .172, F(5, 51) = 3.33, p = .011.
No other regression models significantly predicted connectivity within the CEN.
Table 6 Hierarchical regression for self-certainty (SC) and group predicting left crus I – right
anterior insula/frontal operculum connectivity.
Predictor
B
t
Step 1
FD
-.054
-1.77
Step 2
FD
-.052
-1.68
SC
-.026
-.831
Group
.080
1.30
Step 3
FD
-.053
-1.84
SC
.028
.821
Group
.094
1.64
-.196
-3.06
Group  SC
Note, FD, framewise displacement; SC, self-certainty

p

R2
.054

F
3.15

p
.082

.037

1.77

.165

.138

3.87

.008

.082
.099
.410
.201
.071
.416
.106
.004
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Figure 4 Scatterplot of connectivity values and self-certainty by group,
illustrating the significant group  self-certainty interaction for ROI-to-ROI connectivity
between the left crus I and right anterior insula/frontal operculum.
3.3.3

Cognitive insight and DMN, CEN, CON
The regression model predicting DMN connectivity showed main effects of head motion

(B = .086, t = 2.32, p = .024) group (B = .199, t = 2.32, p = .024), and a significant interaction (B
= -.195, t = -2.27, p = .027). The model was not significant when correcting for multiple
comparisons (adjusted R2 = .160, F(4, 52) = 3.66, p = .011). Regression models predicting CEN,
CON, and cerebellar connectivity were not significant.
3.3.4

Clinical insight and DMN, CEN, CON
Hierarchical regression indicated a significant main effect of clinical insight on DMN

connectivity (adjusted R2 = .379, F(2, 32) = 11.38, p < .001; see Table 7 and Figure 5). Poorer
clinical insight predicted significantly higher connectivity within the DMN (B = .058, t = 4.68, p
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< .001). Clinical insight accounted for 40% of the variance in DMN connectivity. When this
regression model was run with symptom severity as a covariate, the relationship remained
significant (adjusted R2 = .364, F(3, 31) = 7.50, p = .001). There was a significant main effect of
head motion on right crus I – PCC connectivity (B = .852, t = 2.44, p = .020), but the model was
not significant after multiple comparisons correction (adjusted R2 = .152, F(2, 32) = 4.06, p =
.027). Similarly, there was a significant main effect of head motion on DMN – CEN connectivity
(B = 1.10, t = 2.13, p = .040), though the model was not significant after multiple comparisons
correction (adjusted R2 = .128, F(2, 32) = 3.50, p = .042). No other regression models
significantly predicted connectivity within the CEN or CON, or between right crus I and left
dlPFC or anterior insula/frontal operculum.
Table 7 Hierarchical regression for clinical insight impairment predicting default mode network
connectivity.
Predictor

B

Step 1
FD
.399
Step 2
FD
.515
Impaired Clinical
.058
Insight
Note, FD, framewise displacement

t

p

.744

.462

1.23

.229

4.68

.000

R2
.016

F
.554

p
.462

.399

11.38

.000
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Figure 5 Scatterplot of default mode network (DMN) connectivity and clinical insight
impairment,
illustrating the main effect of impaired clinical insight on DMN connectivity.

3.3.5

Clinical and cognitive insight and primary visual cortex
Hierarchical regression models predicting connectivity between the primary visual cortex

and PCC and right dlPFC showed a main effect of head motion, but regression models were not
significant after correction for multiple comparisons (see Tables 20 – 23 in Appendix B).
3.4

Seed-to-Voxel Connectivity
Significant results are reported based on the proposed method of analysis, though it was

recently revealed that clusterwise correction for multiple comparisons is susceptible to false
positives (Eklund, Nichols, & Knutsson, 2016). Therefore, these exploratory results should be
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viewed as trends that should be replicated in a larger sample with more power. Connectivity
maps for each seed ROI are presented in Appendix B.
The strongest seed-to-voxel result was a group  self-certainty interaction for
connectivity between the left crus I seed and right middle frontal gyrus. The significant cluster
was centered at MNI coordinates (45, 48, 15), with a peak T value of 4.82, pFWE-corr = .007 (see
Figure 6 and Table 24 in Appendix D). In this analysis, there was also a significant cluster in the
anterior cingulate gyrus, centered at MNI coordinates (6, 33, 42), with a peak T value of 4.40,
pFWE-corr = .035.

Figure 6 Significant interaction for self-certainty predicting connectivity between the left crus I
and right middle frontal gyrus (dlPFC).
a) Significant cluster centered at MNI coordinates (45, 48, 15), with a cluster extent of 116
voxels. A cluster forming threshold of p < .001 was applied, and this cluster was significant at
the cluster level with a familywise-corrected significance of p = .007. The color bar shows T
values. b) Scatterplot of individual connectivity values (Fisher’s z scores) extracted from the
significant cluster displayed in a), plotted against self-certainty.

Further seed-to-voxel results that are more likely to be false positives are illustrated in
Appendix D. There was a significant group  self-reflectiveness interaction for connectivity
between the right crus I and left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (vlPFC). The significant cluster
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was centered at MNI coordinates (-33, 51, -6), with a peak T value of 4.88, pFWE-corr = .021
(Table 24, Figure 9). There was also a significant group  self-certainty interaction for
connectivity between the right crus I seed and right middle frontal gyrus, centered at MNI
coordinates (42, 48, 15) with a peak T value of 4.11, pFWE-corr = .038 (See Table 24, Figure 11).
Similarly, there was a significant group  self-certainty interaction for connectivity between the
right dlPFC seed and right crus I/II. The significant cluster was centered at MNI coordinates (30,
-81, -33) with a peak T value of 4.47, pFWE-corr = .049 (see Table 24, Figure 11).
Seed-to-voxel analysis for clinical insight showed a significant main effect of clinical
insight on connectivity between the PCC and vmPFC. The significant cluster was centered at
MNI coordinates (-6, 30 0) with a peak T value of 4.78, pFWE-corr = .011 (see Figure 7).

Figure 7 Significant main effect of clinical insight predicting connectivity between the posterior
cingulate cortex (PCC) and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC).
a) Significant cluster centered at MNI coordinates (-6, 30, 0), with a cluster extent of 113 voxels.
A cluster forming threshold of p < .001 was applied, and this cluster was significant at the cluster
level with a familywise-corrected significance of p = .011. The color bar shows T values. b)
Scatterplot of individual connectivity values (Fisher’s z scores) extracted from the significant
cluster displayed in a), plotted against impaired clinical insight.
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4

DISCUSSION

The strongest result of this study was that poorer clinical insight in UHR was related to
stronger DMN connectivity, which was corroborated by exploratory analyses. In addition, this
UHR sample reported higher self-reflectiveness than controls, and high self-reflectiveness was
associated with stronger DMN connectivity in UHR but not in controls. Greater self-certainty in
UHR was associated with lower connectivity between the left crus I and right prefrontal cortex.
Exploratory findings also suggested that weaker posterior cerebellum – PFC connectivity was
associated with greater self-reflectiveness and self-certainty in UHR adolescents. Two patterns
emerged: first, in UHR adolescents, the default mode network (DMN) appears to be associated
with self-reflective processes including clinical insight; second, connectivity between the
cerebellum and lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC) appears to be related to cognitive insight
subscales, especially self-certainty. These findings are broadly aligned with Shad et al.’s (2007)
hypothesis of neurobiological underpinnings of insight, as different networks appear to be
associated with self-reflective and cognitive aspects of insight.
4.1
4.1.1

Insight in UHR
Cognitive Insight
UHR reported higher self-reflectiveness and cognitive insight than controls, contrary to

hypotheses. One explanation for this finding is that UHR adolescents’ high self-reflectiveness
may indicate “hyper-reflexivity” described by Sass (2014). Hyper-reflexivity includes both
passive phenomena such as spontaneous auditory hallucinations, and (over)active self-reflection,
so these adolescents may be thinking about their inner mental life more than others and also may
be thinking differently to the average adolescent. UHR youths may be unsure what their

43

attenuated symptoms are and trying to make sense of them, so their confusion may be reported as
high self-reflectiveness on the BCIS.
Sass and Parnas (Sass, 2014; Sass & Parnas, 2003) argued that the central disturbance in
schizophrenia is a disordered sense of self, and that this disturbance can be linked to positive,
negative, and cognitive symptoms. In addition, Nelson et al. (2012) found self-disturbance to be
greater in UHR than controls, and found that a self-disturbance measure predicted transition to
psychosis above and beyond other factors. Therefore, distorted self-reflection may be a core
deficit in psychosis that begins early in the disease process and may be a way of identifying who
is most at risk. Similar to the current study, Warman and Martin (2006) reported that delusionproneness in non-psychotic college students was associated with both high self-reflectiveness
and self-certainty, and Lyngberg et al. (2015) found a positive correlation between hallucinatory
behavior and self-reflectiveness. These previous studies, and the evidence reported in this study,
suggest that while individuals who are not psychotic but have psychotic-like experiences or
attenuated positive symptoms may report more self-reflection, it appears that those who actually
develop psychosis are less self-reflective (Riggs et al., 2012). Longitudinal research over several
years would be the best way to confirm if the BCIS has good positive predictive value for UHR
individuals, and whether UHR adolescents lose ability to self-reflect.
Alternatively, the relatively high parental education and IQ of our sample may indicate
that despite being at-risk, these adolescents are relatively high-functioning and more able to selfreflect than other samples. It may be that within the UHR group, those individuals who
demonstrate higher self-certainty and lower self-reflectiveness are more at-risk than others
(Warman & Martin, 2006), but there was not enough power to investigate these subsets of
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participants. As it is expected that approximately two-thirds of our sample will not develop
psychosis, it is possible that high self-reflectiveness is a protective factor for some individuals.
The difference between UHR and control groups in cognitive insight, and the direction of
the difference, appears to be driven by self-reflectiveness, as self-reflectiveness and cognitive
insight were highly correlated. Further, because self-reflectiveness and self-certainty were not
significantly correlated, it appears that self-reflectiveness and self-certainty are more informative
as separate measures than the composite cognitive insight score, at least in individuals who have
not been diagnosed with a psychotic disorder (Engh et al., 2007; Warman & Martin, 2006).
Similarly, Winton-Brown et al. (2015) found that individuals with at-risk mental state (ARMS’s)
performance on tasks measuring jumping to conclusions (similar to self-certainty) and verbal
self-monitoring (similar to self-reflectiveness) were not correlated, and reasoned that they are
related to different cognitive processes.
The two previous studies of cognitive insight in UHR indicated only higher self-certainty
than controls (Uchida et al., 2014), and no differences between controls and UHR (Kimhy et al.,
2014). Our UHR group did report somewhat higher self-certainty than controls, which was also
higher than Uchida’s UHR and controls, but the difference was not significant. Thus, it is
possible that high self-certainty is specific to psychosis or there was not enough power to detect a
difference. It should be noted that the controls in this study reported lower self-reflectiveness
than other studies of healthy participants (approximately one standard deviation lower than
Martin et al. (2010)), so caution must be exercised in interpreting results in relation to controls.
One explanation for this finding is that the controls may appear less self-reflective in comparison
to UHR because they do not feel the three items referring to “unusual experiences” apply to
them, and thus have a different reference point for these items (David et al., 2012; Engh et al.,
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2007). While the two groups significantly differed in their responses to these items, when the
items were removed from the self-reflectiveness subscale, there was still a significant group
difference. Thus, it is unlikely that responses on these three items influenced the control group’s
low self-reflectiveness. Although a large study indicated that the BCIS is appropriate for control
participants (Martin et al., 2010), the current sample appears to have responded differently and
makes it difficult to draw conclusions about cognitive insight in UHR.
Investigations of cognitive insight and its relationship to clinical and cognitive measures
in UHR revealed that higher self-certainty was related to better working memory and fewer
negative symptoms, contrary to what was expected based on the limited schizophrenia literature
(Nair et al., 2014). Concordantly, working memory and negative symptoms were positively
correlated in this group. Thus, it appears that greater rigidity and tendency to jump to
conclusions is actually associated with better working memory and a lower tendency for
behaviors such as avolition and anhedonia in this UHR sample. A similar relationship was
observed between working memory and self-certainty in the control group, which may indicate
that these processes are not yet impaired in our sample, and potentially even protective. In
addition, higher self-reflectiveness was associated with better social cognition, suggesting that
ability to reflect on one’s own mental states may be associated with understanding others’ mental
states and interacting socially. Self-reflectiveness was further correlated with higher IQ.
Importantly, when potential leverage points were removed from the self-reflectiveness
correlations, they became nonsignificant, and no correlations survived correction for multiple
comparisons, indicating that these relationships are tenuous and require investigation in a larger
sample. These correlations suggest that the UHR group demonstrated expected relationships
between cognitive measures and self-reflectiveness, but unexpected relationships between
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cognitive measures and self-certainty. As mentioned previously, these cognitive insight
dimensions may be more useful separately, and self-certainty may be less informative in a UHR
population than in a psychosis population.
Overall, it is difficult to make inferences about the nature of cognitive insight in our
sample compared to control participants. UHR may be hyper-reflexive as suggested by Sass
(2014), but it remains a possibility that self-reflectiveness and self-certainty are not impaired
until the onset of psychosis. It also appears that the samples of UHR adolescents and controls
under investigation can greatly influence group differences, as each study of cognitive insight in
UHR has yielded different results. Further, it is possible that the BCIS is not tapping into the
same phenomena in adolescents as it is in adults, as brain development and social processes are
likely to affect self-reflectiveness and self-certainty (Brent et al., 2014). Investigating
longitudinal properties of the BCIS in prodromal youth would be important in determining
whether it is an informative measure during this period. Thus far, cognitive insight dimensions
appear to be stable for one month in UHR (Lyngberg et al., 2015), but longer periods and larger
samples are necessary.
4.1.2

Clinical Insight
UHR adolescents showed a range of clinical insight, though not as severely impaired as

in schizophrenia, and most participants were considered by clinicians to be aware of their mental
health difficulties (Amador et al., 1993; Michel et al., 2013; Parellada et al., 2011). In the only
other UHR clinical insight study, Lappin et al. (2007) used a different clinical insight scale, but
found clinical insight to be impaired in ARMS (as a percentage of total insight), and not as
impaired as in first-episode psychosis (FEP). Their study also indicated that within the ARMS
group, clinical insight was not significantly correlated with symptom severity, but when ARMS
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and FEP were pooled (increasing degrees of freedom), there was a significant correlation,
suggesting a relationship between clinical insight and symptom severity across the psychosis
continuum and a potential neurodevelopmental course. Within the current UHR sample, poorer
clinical insight was associated with more severe positive and negative symptoms, in line with the
schizophrenia literature (Mintz et al., 2003), and suggesting that this relationship may indeed
exist prior to onset of a psychotic disorder. Thus, clinical insight may be a potential point of
early intervention when adolescents begin experiencing sub-threshold psychotic symptoms.
There is limited evidence for insight improving with targeted therapy in schizophrenia
(Pijnenborg, van Donkersgoed, David, & Aleman, 2013), so it may be worth investigating if this
helps improve symptoms in UHR and even potentially prevents psychosis onset.
An important caveat with measuring clinical insight in UHR is that the range may be
somewhat restricted in this sample compared to individuals with diagnosed psychotic disorders
by the nature of the UHR definition. Specifically, if UHR adolescents are too unaware of their
symptoms, they are likely to meet criteria for a psychotic disorder diagnosis and thus would be
excluded from this study. Also, because the SUMD was developed for use with individuals with
a psychotic disorder diagnosis, it may not be measuring the same construct in adolescents who
have not been diagnosed yet, even though clinicians did report a range of awareness.
4.2

DMN and Insight
The strongest imaging result of this study was that greater DMN connectivity was

associated with poorer clinical insight in UHR. Concomitantly, greater DMN connectivity was
associated with lower self-reflectiveness in this group. However, self-reflectiveness was not
associated with DMN connectivity in controls, contrary to hypotheses and previous literature
linking the DMN with self-reflection in healthy individuals (Northoff et al., 2006; van der Meer
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et al., 2010). Thus, perhaps those UHR youth that are not particularly self-reflective have hyperconnected DMN, or perhaps our control participants were not interpreting the BCIS in the same
way as UHR participants, as suggested above. Therefore, the focus will be more on individual
differences within UHR than on UHR compared to controls.
Results suggest that poorer insight is associated with DMN hyperconnectivity, in line
with past research indicating hyperconnectivity and hyperactivity within the DMN in UHR
(Shim et al., 2010) and schizophrenia (Whitfield-Gabrieli & Ford, 2012) compared to healthy
controls. In addition, a previous study linked stronger DMN connectivity to poorer clinical
insight in schizophrenia (Gerretsen et al., 2014), though between the PCC/precuneus and left
angular gyrus and not between PCC/precuneus and vmPFC. However, the other connectivity and
clinical insight study in schizophrenia indicated lower connectivity in the PCC and ACC in those
with impaired clinical insight, but these researchers did not measure connectivity between PCC
and ACC, and dichotomized clinical insight, in contrast to Gerretsen’s and the current methods
(Liemburg et al., 2012).
Further, studies employing self-reflection tasks implicated DMN structures in both selfreflection and insight (Ćurčić-Blake et al., 2015; Modinos, Renken, Ormel, & Aleman, 2011; van
der Meer et al., 2013). One implicated the PCC and vmPFC during a clinical insight task that
asked mental-illness related questions (Raij et al., 2012). Another associated self-reflectiveness
with vmPFC activity during a self-reflection task in individuals with schizophrenia (van der
Meer et al., 2013), and Ćurčić-Blake et al. (2015) found hyperconnectivity between the PCC and
vmPFC during self-reflection in schizophrenia patients with poor clinical insight. In addition,
another study indicated that a higher psychosis score was associated with higher activity of the
vmPFC in healthy individuals with psychosis-prone traits (Modinos et al., 2011). Taken together,

49

these studies indicate that an overactive DMN may reflect an inability to disengage from
internally-focused thought or overactive “tagging” of stimuli for self-relevance (Ćurčić-Blake et
al., 2015), as well as difficulty in retrieving autobiographical memories (van der Meer et al.,
2010). Disruption of these processes may result in a distorted view of the self in relation to others
and illness, and it appears that they may be disrupted across the psychosis continuum.
This study is the first to find that higher DMN connectivity is associated with poorer
clinical insight prior to psychosis onset, and it was shown in both ROI-to-ROI and seed-to-voxel
analysis, strengthening confidence in the results. Thus, it appears that DMN hyperconnectivity is
associated with poor illness awareness, and that this relationship is present in the high-risk state.
This study is also the first to associate self-reflectiveness measured by the BCIS with DMN
connectivity, and thus results support the dominant view that the DMN is associated with selfreflection generally (Northoff et al., 2006; van der Meer et al., 2010). As UHR adolescents who
reported lower self-reflectiveness also demonstrated stronger DMN connectivity, a hyperconnected DMN may lead to an impaired ability to reflect on one’s own thoughts generally and
reflect on one’s illness. If UHR adolescents are experiencing a breakdown in self-monitoring as
one of the first signs of psychosis (Garety et al., 2001; Nelson et al., 2012; Sass, 2014), it is
possible that this breakdown is associated with a hyperconnected DMN. Further research is
required to determine if self-disturbance is associated with insight and the DMN, ideally
combining clinical and cognitive insight measures, a self-disturbance measure, and
neuroimaging.
While the current study presents compelling evidence that the DMN is associated with
self-reflectiveness and clinical insight in UHR, hypotheses involving the CEN were not
supported, suggesting that clinical insight in UHR is more closely related to self-awareness than
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executive function. It may be the case that executive functioning has a greater impact on the
ability to recognize one’s illness after psychosis onset, or that insight is not directly associated
with executive function networks, and rather, executive functioning may influence clinical
insight through self-monitoring (Shad et al., 2007).
4.3

Cerebellum – Prefrontal Cortex Circuits and Insight
While clinical insight and self-reflectiveness were related to the DMN and thus self-

related processing, self-certainty was associated with connectivity between the posterior
cerebellum (crus I) and PFC, suggesting a relationship with executive function. However, as
hypotheses involving the CEN were not supported, there may be a specific relationship between
self-certainty and cerebello-cortical loops. Greater self-certainty in UHR was associated with
lower connectivity between the left crus I and right anterior insula/frontal operculum (a node of
the CON), as well as lower connectivity between the left crus I and right dlPFC (a node of the
CEN). Because the cerebellum is thought to aid in efficiency of cognition and help free up
prefrontal cognitive resources for complex tasks (Ramnani, 2006), it is possible that a
disturbance in this system makes it more difficult for individuals to perform complex cognitive
tasks, such as analyzing one’s own thoughts and resisting jumping to conclusions.
Relatedly, Dosenbach and colleagues associated the posterior cerebellum – CON/CEN
relationship with error detection (Dosenbach et al., 2006, 2008), and Klein et al. (2007) observed
that the bilateral anterior insula was active during error processing as well. The anterior insula
has consistently been implicated as an important region for sense of self, including introspection,
salience, and interoception (Craig, 2009; Manoliu et al., 2014; Palaniyappan & Liddle, 2012;
Sridharan, Levitin, & Menon, 2008). It is also postulated to be involved in schizophrenia, and
particularly delusion, pathogenesis (Palaniyappan & Liddle, 2012; Raij, Mäntylä, Mantere,
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Kieseppä, & Suvisaari, 2016). Craig (2009) suggested that the right anterior insula integrates
emotional and interoceptive states, which may affect ability to recognize one’s internal states as
pathological. He also speculated that the junction of the anterior insula/frontal operculum is
responsible for generating a representation of the self in the current moment. Therefore, reduced
connectivity between crus I and anterior insula/frontal operculum in those with high selfcertainty suggests that a failure of error detection in relation to self-perception may be associated
with rigid overconfidence in one’s cognitions, and inability to recognize incorrect cognitions.
Recent meta-analysis revealed that left crus I is consistently associated with executive
functions broadly, as well as working memory, language, and emotion (Keren-Happuch et al.,
2014). Low connectivity between crus I and the dlPFC was also found in schizophrenia, which
may indicate that those individuals with high self-certainty and low crus I – dlPFC connectivity
are more at-risk for schizophrenia. Koziol et al. (2009) posited that the cerebellum’s role in
executive function is specifying how to perform behavior—it helps with smoothly manipulating
ideas for problem-solving. In addition, Küper et al. (2015) observed increasing cerebellar
activation (including crus I) as a working memory task became more difficult, suggesting that
the cerebellum offers “online” support to the cortex during more complex processes. Perhaps
reduced connectivity in the current study reflects inability for the cerebellum to take over and
automate self-certainty-related cognitions (Ramnani, 2006), and those UHR individuals with
lower connectivity therefore make more errors in judgment.
Koziol and colleagues (2011) also argued that the cerebellum is sending “bad data” to the
cortex in schizophrenia, resulting in impaired executive functions. Similar to crus I’s relationship
with the CON, poor error detection and less modulation of cognitive control via the dlPFC may
result in more rigidity and unwillingness to reconsider one’s cognitions, though more behavioral
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data is needed to confirm this idea, particularly because UHR in this study with high selfcertainty showed better working memory and there was no relationship with executive function
measures. Notably, Gerretsen and colleagues (2014) also found their cognitive control ROIs in
the dlPFC to be more weakly connected to cerebellar regions in individuals with greater selfcertainty, though their results did not pass multiple comparisons correction. As these may be
subtle effects, a larger sample than Gerretsen’s and the current study may be necessary to test for
specificity of these relationships.
Voxelwise analyses also suggested that posterior cerebellum – lateral PFC connectivity is
related to self-reflectiveness and self-certainty in UHR adolescents, and there was overlap with
the ROI-to-ROI results. While the seed-to-voxel results suggest potentially interesting cerebellar
– PFC relationships, a recent paper highlighted that the threshold method used is susceptible to
false positives (Eklund et al., 2016), and significant results are not particularly strong. Therefore,
before firm conclusions can be drawn it would be necessary to replicate these findings with a
more detailed study of sufficient power to detect voxelwise correction for multiple comparisons.
The group  self-certainty interaction in connectivity between the right dlPFC and the
right crus I/II and between left crus I and the right middle frontal gyrus indicated a positive
relationship in controls and a negative relationship in UHR. Both of these results echo what was
found in ROI-to-ROI analyses, suggesting that the posterior cerebellum and right dlPFC may
comprise an important network in the development of psychosis. The relationship between the
left crus I and right dlPFC is particularly interesting, as it is the strongest seed-to-voxel result and
is located near the effect observed between left crus I and right dlPFC in ROI-to-ROI analysis.
The group  self-reflectiveness interaction in connectivity between the right crus I and
the left vlPFC revealed a positive relationship with self-reflectiveness in controls, but a negative
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relationship in UHR. These results overlap with previous studies of insight implicating the
inferior frontal gyrus in self-reflectiveness, self-reflection tasks, and clinical insight (Bedford et
al., 2012; Buchy et al., 2014, 2015; van der Meer et al., 2013). As the result in this study was not
particularly strong and potentially a false positive, replication is necessary.
Results from this study add to the increasing literature illustrating diverse functions of the
cerebellum beyond motor functions, and suggest that the cerebellum should be incorporated into
network models of psychosis (Bernard et al., 2014; Bernard & Mittal, 2015; Dean et al., 2013;
Mittal et al., 2013). Many neuroimaging studies do not include the cerebellum, despite its
potential importance for many cognitive processes. In fact, Nekovarova et al.’s (2014) triple
network argument alludes to the cerebellum in self-disturbance because they describe selfdisturbance as a disconnect between predicted and perceived consequences, through efference
copies and forward and inverse models (activities ascribed to the cerebellum; Ramnani, 2006). A
recent theoretical article argued that the cerebellum may even be centrally involved in the
development of self, so abnormal development of the cerebellum may lead to disorders in which
self-awareness is impaired, such as schizophrenia (Ceylan, Dönmez, & Ülsalver, 2015). In
relation to insight, the cerebellum may help to maintain a stable sense of self during retrieval of
autobiographical memories and self-projection into future or others’ mental states. Thus, if the
internal models of the cerebellum are not functioning optimally, the individual may not have the
correct self-reference point and make errors in judgment, possibly reflected in high self-certainty.
4.4

Limitations
This study does not come without limitations. First, the sample size was small, limiting

power to detect subtle differences and generalizability. In addition, although previous research
has demonstrated that the BCIS is useful for studying healthy controls (Buchy et al., 2014;
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Martin et al., 2010), it is possible that in an adolescent population such as this one, the scale is
not as relevant or is not measuring the same construct. This study highlights the importance of a
BCIS validation study in adolescents—both healthy controls and UHR. By nature of this sample,
there was also a limited range of clinical insight compared to studies of schizophrenia because
adolescents with severely impaired clinical insight would be diagnosed with schizophrenia.
Again, it may be more informative to use a clinical insight scale more tailored to the UHR
population.
The nature of neuroimaging also introduces potential confounds, as MRI signals can be
contaminated with noise, even when controlled for using recommended methods. Nuisance
signals were regressed out using recommended methods, and head motion was entered as a
covariate in our second-level analyses, but it is always possible that signals are arising from
unknown sources (Weinberger & Radulescu, 2015). However, as results do broadly align with
other studies of insight in psychosis, they do likely represent consistent brain networks
associated with clinical and cognitive insight. Further, the methods used in this study cannot
infer causation or directionality of connectivity, as it was a cross-sectional study. In the future, it
may be useful to use methods such as dynamic causal modeling or Granger causality to infer
which network nodes are influencing each other and to what degree.
4.5

Future Directions
The original study for which these data were collected at the University of Colorado,

Boulder is still ongoing, with follow-up data for many participants. Therefore, in the future it
will be possible to see who developed psychosis and who did not, and investigate whether insight
and/or connectivity have good positive predictive value. It would also be informative to examine
subsets of the UHR group who have high self-certainty and low self-reflectiveness compared to
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previous literature, to see if they differ from the rest of the group in symptoms or other cognitive
measures or if they have a different neurodevelopmental trajectory. Because the control group in
this study may not have had the most reliable BCIS scores, it may be more valuable to compare
cognitive insight dimensions in those who transition versus those who do not. Ultimately, it
would be most useful to understand whether clinical and/or cognitive insight can predict who
will develop a psychotic disorder and who will benefit from psychosocial or treatments targeting
self-reflection or self-certainty, or even neurostimulation treatments.
4.6

Summary
In summary, these results lend some support to the triple network-inspired model of

psychosis symptoms that proposed impaired coordination within and between large-scale
networks may underlie self-disturbance that precedes and then contributes to the wide array of
symptoms seen in psychosis (Nekovarova et al., 2014). It also partially supports Shad et al.’s
(2007) theoretical model implicating executive function and self-awareness in different
dimensions of insight. Specifically, the DMN appears to be particularly important, as evidenced
by previous work and the current study. In this UHR sample, poorer clinical insight was
associated with more positive and negative symptoms and a hyperconnected DMN. Low selfreflectiveness also appears to also be associated with a hyperconnected DMN, suggesting that a
hyperconnected DMN in UHR, as observed in previous literature, may reduce the ability to selfreflect and recognize one’s mental problems. The differences between controls and UHR in
reported self-reflectiveness appear to be tenuous, but may suggest hyper-reflexivity in UHR
proposed by Sass and Nekovarova, which may also be supported by the DMN connectivity
results (Nekovarova et al., 2014; Sass, 2014).
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Greater self-certainty in UHR appears to be associated with weaker connectivity between
the cerebellum and prefrontal cognitive control regions, which may indicate poor coordination of
self-related cognition and poor control over cognition. Despite not finding differences in selfcertainty between controls and UHR, reduced connectivity between crus I and the lateral PFC in
individuals with high levels of self-certainty suggests a potential neural basis for errors in
judgment or jumping to conclusions that can be studied longitudinally across the psychosis
continuum. If the cerebellum is not efficiently modulating cognitive processes in concert with
major intrinsic networks (Buckner et al., 2011; Koziol et al., 2009; Ramnani, 2006),
consequences may include judgment errors and an impaired sense of self, and it is possible that
this dysregulation leads to psychosis (Andreasen & Pierson, 2008). With further research,
clinical and cognitive insight and associated brain networks may indicate potential risk factors
and psychosocial, cognitive, or brain stimulation interventions to prevent psychosis.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A Correlations among insight, clinical, and cognitive measures.
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

.446
N=19
.050
N=43

-.492*
N=27

1. Self-Reflectiveness
2. Self-Certainty

-.198
N=32

3. Cognitive Insight

.853**
N=32

-.681**
N=32

-.230
N=29
.111
N=32

-.269
N=29
-.295
N=32

-.025
N=29
.240
N=32

.465**
N=52

6. Negative Symptoms

.073
N=32

-.432*
N=32

.285
N=32

.318*
N=52

.422**
N=55

7. Processing Speed

.217
N=26

.309
N=26

-.001
N=26

-.241
N=44

-.113
N=45

-.187
N=45

8. Working Memory

.272
N=27

.382*
N=27

.000
N=27

-.166
N=46

-.004
N=47

.358*
N=47

.536**
N=45

.216
N=27
.424*
N=27

.022
N=27
.362
N=27

.158
N=27
.080
N=27

-.068
N=46
-.030
N=46

-.160
N=47
.125
N=47

-.145
N=47
.045
N=47

.406**
N=45
.416**
N=45

.343*
N=47
.271
N=47

.315*
N=47

-.127
-.300
-.264
.105
-.115
.287
N=19
N=19
N=19
N=19
N=19
N=19
.426*
.033
.289
-.008
.399**
-.091
12. IQ (WRAT)
N=25
N=25
N=25
N=42
N=43
N=43
* correlation is significant at the .05 level; ** correlation is significant at the .01 level

-.049
N=19
.035
N=41

.011
N=19
.201
N=43

.251
N=19
-.120
N=43

4. Clinical Insight
5. Positive Symptoms

9. Problem Solving
10. Social Cognition
11. Executive Function
(Trails B – Trails A)

12.
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Appendix B Results of nonsignificant ROI-to-ROI regression analyses
Table 8 Hierarchical regression for group and self-certainty (SC) predicting right CEN
connectivity.
Predictor
Step 1
FD
Step 2
FD
SC
Group
Step 3
FD
SC
Group
Group  SC

B

t

p

-.007

-.153

.879

-.017
.060
.155

-.387
1.36
1.78

.700
.180
.081

-.017
.061
.156
-.004

-.384
1.17
1.76
-.040

.702
.247
.084
.968

R2
.000

F
.023

p
.879

.097

1.90

.141

.000

1.40

.248

Table 9 Hierarchical regression for group and self-reflectiveness (SR) predicting right crus I –
PCC connectivity.
Predictor
Step 1
FD
Step 2
FD
SR
Group
Step 3
FD
SR
Group
Group  SR

B

t

p

.046

1.48

.146

.046
.026
.029

1.47
.664
.372

.147
.510
.711

.050
.061
.030
-.061

1.57
1.01
.382
-.763

.123
.317
.704
.449

R2
.038

F
2.18

p
.146

.025

1.18

.326

.010

1.02

.404

Table 10 Hierarchical regression for group and cognitive insight (CI) predicting DMN
connectivity.
Predictor
Step 1
FD
Step 2
FD
CI
Group
Step 3
FD
CI
Group
Group  CI

B

t

p

.080

2.09

.041

.072
-.065
.177

1.89
-1.47
2.00

.064
.146
.051

.086
.026
.199
-.195

2.32
.438
2.32
-2.26

.024
.663
.024
.027

R2
.074

F
4.38

p
.041

.069

2.93

.042

.077

3.66

.011
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Table 11 Hierarchical regression for group and cognitive insight (CI) predicting right crus I –
PCC connectivity.
Predictor
Step 1
FD
Step 2
FD
CI
Group
Step 3
FD
CI
Group
Group  CI

B

t

p

.046

1.48

.146

.045
.004
.056

1.44
-.121
.762

.156
.904
.449

.046
.008
.057
-.007

1.42
.152
.761
-.095

.161
.880
.450
.925

R2
.038

F
2.18

p
.146

.017

1.03

.387

.000

.760

.556

Table 12 Hierarchical regression for group and cognitive insight (CI) predicting left crus I –
right dlPFC connectivity.
Predictor
Step 1
FD
Step 2
FD
CI
Group
Step 3
FD
CI
Group
Group  CI

B

t

p

-.119

-3.97

.000

-.116
.024
-.074

-3.79
.675
-1.04

.000
.502
.303

-.118
.007
-.078
.037

-3.81
.136
-1.09
.515

.000
.892
.283
.609

R2
.223

F
15.79

p
.000

.016

5.55

.002

.004

4.17

.005

Table 13 Hierarchical regression for group and cognitive insight (CI) predicting right CEN
connectivity.
Predictor
Step 1
FD
Step 2
FD
CI
Group
Step 3
FD
CI
Group
Group  CI

B

t

p

-.007

-.153

.879

-.012
-.030
.201

-.279
-.587
1.95

.782
.560
.057

-.007
.001
.209
-.068

-.162
.018
2.00
-.647

.872
.986
.051
.520

R2
.000

F
.023

p
.879

.71

1.36

.265

.007

1.11

.360
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Table 14 Hierarchical regression for group and cognitive insight (CI) predicting left crus I –
right anterior insula/frontal operculum connectivity.
Predictor
Step 1
FD
Step 2
FD
CI
Group
Step 3
FD
CI
Group
Group  CI

B

t

p

-.054

-1.77

.082

-.055
-.001
.075

-1.78
-.036
1.04

.080
.971
.303

-.056
-.006
.074
.010

-1.76
-.117
1.01
.132

.084
.908
.318
.895

R2
.054

F
3.15

p
.082

.025

1.52

.221

.000

1.12

.357

Table 15 Hierarchical regression for clinical insight impairment predicting right crus I – PCC
connectivity.
Predictor
Step 1
FD
Step 2
FD
Impaired
Clinical Insight

B

t

p

.818

2.30

.028

.852

2.44

.020

.017

1.61

.118

R2
.138

F
5.27

p
.028

.065

4.06

.027

Table16 Hierarchical regression for clinical insight impairment predicting right CEN
connectivity.
Predictor
Step 1
FD
Step 2
FD
Impaired
Clinical Insight

B

t

p

-.030

-.047

.962

-.070

-.110

.913

-.020

-1.05

.302

R2
.000

F
.002

p
.962

.033

.552

.581

Table 17 Hierarchical regression for clinical insight impairment predicting left crus I – right
anterior insula/frontal operculum connectivity.
Predictor
Step 1
FD
Step 2
FD
Impaired
Clinical Insight

B

t

p

-.254

-.507

.615

-.238

-.470

.641

.008

.509

.614

R2
.008

F
.257

p
.615

.008

.256

.776
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Table 18 Hierarchical regression for clinical insight impairment predicting left crus I – right
dlPFC connectivity.
Predictor
Step 1
FD
Step 2
FD
Impaired
Clinical Insight

B

t

p

-.943

-2.23

.032

-.931

-2.18

.037

.006

.477

.637

R2
.131

F
4.991

p
.032

.006

2.55

.094

Table 19 Hierarchical regression for clinical insight impairment predicting connectivity between
the DMN and CEN.
Predictor
Step 1
FD
Step 2
FD
Impaired
Clinical Insight

B

t

p

1.05

1.99

.055

1.10

2.13

.040

.026

1.68

.102

R2
.107

F
3.95

p
.055

.073

3.50

.042

Table 20 Hierarchical regression for group and self-reflectiveness (SR) predicting primary visual
cortex – PCC connectivity.
Predictor
Step 1
FD
Step 2
FD
SR
Group
Step 3
FD
SR
Group
Group  SR

B

t

p

.127

3.34

.002

.129
.053
-.039

3.35
1.10
-.399

.001
.276
.692

.128
.049
-.039
.006

3.27
.667
-.396
.065

.002
.508
.694
.948

R2
.153

F
11.13

p
.002

.020

4.11

.011

.000

3.02

.026

Table 21 Hierarchical regression for clinical insight impairment predicting primary visual cortex
– PCC connectivity.
Predictor
Step 1
FD
Step 2
FD
Impaired
Clinical Insight

B

t

p

1.33

2.60

.014

1.32

2.54

.016

-.006

-.390

.699

R2
.170

F
6.77

p
.014

.004

3.37

.047
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Table 22 Hierarchical regression for group and self-certainty predicting primary visual cortex –
right dlPFC connectivity.
Predictor
Step 1
FD
Step 2
FD
SC
Group
Step 3
FD
SC
Group
Group  SC

B

t

p

.111

3.86

.000

.112
-.002
.019

3.76
-.078
.313

.000
.938
.756

.111
.014
.023
-.060

3.74
.401
.386
-.902

.000
.690
.701
.371

R2
.213

F
14.91

p
.000

.001

4.83

.005

.012

3.81

.009
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Appendix C Connectivity maps of seeds of interest

Figure 8 Connectivity maps of seeds of interest used for seed-to-voxel analysis. a) PCC, b) right
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), c) right crus I, d) left crus I. Maps were created by
running a one sample t test in SPM8, with all subjects combined. Results were (arbitrarily)
thresholded with a minimum T value of 10 in order to demonstrate areas of maximal
connectivity. The color bar shows T values.
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Appendix D Seed-to-voxel Connectivity Results
Table 23 Significant seed – voxel clusters for Group  self-reflectiveness (SR) or self-certainty
(SC) interactions (indicated in the table as SR or SC). Models were specified in Statistical
Parametric Mapping (SPM) using the flexible factorial approach, including framewise
displacement (FD) as a covariate of no interest. A cluster-forming threshold of p < .001 was
applied, and clusters were considered significant if they passed cluster FWE-corrected p < .05.
Number of
Voxels

MNI Coordinates
(x, y, z)

Brodmann
Area

T value

pFWE-corrected

85

-33, 51, -6

47

4.88

.021

-51, 42, 0

45

4.24

-42, 51, 3

46

4.14

42, 48, 15

46

4.11

48, 36, 21

45

4.06

45, 48, 15

46

4.82

R Middle Frontal Gyrus

42, 42, 21

45

4.45

R Frontal Inferior
Triangle

51, 30, 27

45

4.25

6, 33, 42

8

4.40

R Anterior Cingulate

9, 42, 24

32

3.74

R Supplementary Motor
Area

6, 24, 48

8

3.59

Region
Right Crus I Seed (SR)
L Middle Frontal Gyrus
(Orbital)
L Frontal Inferior
Triangle
L Middle Frontal Gyrus
Right Crus I Seed (SC)
R Middle Frontal Gyrus

72

R Middle Frontal Gyrus

.038

Left Crus I Seed (SC)
R Middle Frontal Gyrus

R Superior Frontal Gyrus

116

76

Right dlPFC Seed (SC)
R Crus I

.007

.035

.049
73

30, -81, -33

NA

4.47

R Crus II

21, -72, -39

NA

4.06

R Crus I

12, -87, -24

NA

3.55

Note, R, right; L, left; SR, self-reflectiveness; SC, self-certainty
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Figure 9 Significant interaction for self-reflectiveness predicting connectivity between the right
crus I seed and left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (vlPFC). a) Significant cluster centered at MNI
coordinates (-33, 51, -6), with a cluster extent of 85 voxels. A cluster forming threshold of p <
.001 was applied, and this cluster was significant at the cluster level with a familywise-corrected
significance of p = .021. The color bar shows T values. b) Scatterplot of individual connectivity
values (Fisher’s z scores) extracted from the significant cluster displayed in a), plotted against
self-certainty.

Figure 10 Significant interaction for self-certainty predicting connectivity between the right crus
I seed and right middle frontal gyrus. a) Significant cluster centered at MNI coordinates (42, 48,
15), with a cluster extent of 46 voxels. A cluster forming threshold of p < .001 was applied, and
this cluster was significant at the cluster level with a familywise-corrected significance of p =
.038. The color bar shows T values. b) Scatterplot of individual connectivity values (Fisher’s z
scores) extracted from the significant cluster displayed in a), plotted against self-certainty.
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Figure 11 Significant interaction for self-certainty predicting connectivity between the right
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) seed and right crus I/II. a) Significant cluster centered at
MNI coordinates (30, -81, -33), with a cluster extent of 116 voxels. A cluster forming threshold
of p < .001 was applied, and this cluster was significant at the cluster level with a familywisecorrected significance of p = .049. The significant cluster has a red box around it and the color
bar shows T values. b) Scatterplot of individual connectivity values (Fisher’s z scores) extracted
from the significant cluster displayed in a), plotted against self-certainty.
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Appendix E Participant Demographics for Subsets in Imaging Analyses
Table 24 Demographic characteristics of sample with imaging data for cognitive insight
analyses.
Healthy Control
(N = 33)

UHR
(N = 24)

Tests

Significance

19.70 ± 1.78

19.17 ± 1.52

t = -1.18

.243

Gender (M/F)

14/19

14/10

2 = 1.41

.289

Handedness (R/L)

24/3

19/1

2 = .551

.626

Race (White/Non-White)

24/12

17/16

2 = 1.64

.228

WRAT Sum IQ (N = 26/19)

104.92 ± 10.26

113.63 ± 12.92

t = 2.52

.016

Framewise Displacement

0.200 ± 0.071

0.204 ± 0.096

t = 0.186

.853

Mother’s Education

15.70 ± 3.00

15.30 ± 1.55

t = -0.640

.525

Father’s Education

15.12 ± 4.27

15.22 ± 3.55

t = .089

.930

GAF Current

86.45 ± 5.52

65.09 ± 15.34

t = -6.40

< .001

Age

Positive Symptoms

11.54 ± 4.88

Negative Symptoms

8.87 ± 6.85

Disorganized Symptoms

5.13 ± 3.76

General Symptoms

6.71 ± 4.39
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Table 25 Demographic characteristics of the sample with imaging data for clinical insight
analyses.
UHR
(N = 35)
Age

18.80 ± 1.72

Gender (M/F)

23/12

Handedness (R/L)

27/1

Race (White/Non-White)

23/11

WRAT Sum IQ

111.31 ± 12.55

Framewise Displacement

0.195 ± 0.093

Mother’s Education

15.50 ± 1.76

Father’s Education

15.24 ± 3.22

GAF Current

63.14 ± 15.40

Positive Symptoms

12.23 ± 5.80

Negative Symptoms

9.17 ± 7.12

Disorganized Symptoms

5.63 ± 4.07

General Symptoms

6.66 ± 4.67

Awareness of Mental Disorder

2.14 ± 1.42

Awareness of Medication
Effects
Awareness of Social
Consequences
Total Clinical Insight

1.00 ± 1.39
1.74 ± 1.56
4.89 ± 3.13

